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THE NEW EAST EUROPEAN
CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS
Herman Schwartz*
Before World War II, few European States had constitutional
courts, and virtually none exercised any significant judicial review over
legislation.' After 1945 all that changed. West Germany, Italy, Aus-
tria, Cyprus, Turkey, Yugoslavia, Greece, Spain, Portugal, and even
France, one of the last bastions of parliamentary sovereignty, created
tribunals with power to annul legislative enactments inconsistent with
constitutional requirements. 2
Many of these courts have become significant-indeed powerful-
institutions; most notably the West German Constitutional Court,
now one of the most highly esteemed courts in the world. Thus, it was
hardly surprising that the newly liberated nations in Central Eastern
Europe and the former Soviet Union, most of which want to become
part of the Western community, decided to establish such courts.3
Since these countries have only recently shaken off communist
domination-and even that is not clear in Romania-some of these
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I. The Czechoslovak Constitutional Court, for example, created in 1920 on an Austrian
model, did not hear a single case challenging the constitutionality of a statute. See generally
EDWARD TABORSKY, CZECHOSLOVAK DEMOCRACY AT WORK (1945). For Weimar Germany
see, e.g., A. BREWER-CARIAS, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN COMPARATIVE LAW 203-04 (1989).
2. Even Great Britain has subjected its legislative and executive action to a judicial tribunal,
the European Court of Human Rights. For a survey of West European constitutional courts, see
Louis Favoreu, Constitutional Review in Europe, in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND RIGHTS: THE
INFLUENCE OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION ABROAD 38 (Louis Henkin and Albert J.
Rosenthal eds., 1990); for the development of judicial review in the West, see generally, MAURO
CAPPELLETTI, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (1989).
3. In some countries, such as Ukraine and Estonia, these provisions are parts of draft consti-
tutions that had not been adopted as of May 1992.
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new courts, such as those in Czechoslovakia and Romania, have
barely begun to function regularly. Of the regularly functioning East
European constitutional courts, some-notably those in Hungary and
Russia-have operated with surprising independence, forcefulness,
and insistence on protecting human rights and the rule of law. In this
respect, these courts are following the lead of many of their West Eu-
ropean predecessors, including the courts of France, Germany, Italy,
and Greece.4
This article will describe some aspects of the different tribunals in
Russia, Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and Romania,
and will compare them with each other and with the U.S. Supreme
Court. The first part will begin by explaining a few basic differences
between the American and Continental systems of judicial review, and
will then describe the functions of the new East European constitu-
tional courts. The second part will use the decisions of the new Rus-
sian Constitutional Court to illustrate the new courts' exercise of
authority, and will summarize the recent activities of a few other new
constitutional courts.
I. CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS AND JUDICIAL REVIEW
To Americans familiar with constitutional tribunals like the U.S.
Supreme Court, these European constitutional courts look very
strange. These new courts are not based on the U.S. Supreme Court,
but on the Continental model created after World War I by the great
Austrian legal theorist Hans Kelsen.
Like their U.S. counterparts, European constitutional courts were
created to ensure governance under the rule of law. Many key ele-
ments, however, such as standing, mootness, ripeness, political ques-
tions, judicial selection, and tenure are handled differently in Europe
than in the United States. The European constitutional courts' subject
matter jurisdictions, though varying among themselves, also differ
from the typical American model, as do some of their powers.
The following section will compare the different American and Eu-
ropean approaches to these issues, 5 and in the course of comparison
describe the functions of the new constitutional courts in Russia, Hun-
4. For one of the leading analyses of the German experience, see DONALD P. KOMMERS,
JUDICIAL POLITICS IN WEST GERMANY: A STUDY OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL COURT
(1976), and Donald P. Kommers, German Constitutionalism: A Prolegomenon, 40 EMORY L.J.
837 (1991); for France, see James Beardsley, Constitutional Review in France, in 1975 SuP. CT.
REV. 189 (Philip B. Kurland ed., 1976); for Italy, see BREWER-CARIAS, supra note 1, at 215.
5. The terms "Continental" and "European" refer to all of Europe and will be used inter-
changeably throughout the article. Any discussion pertaining solely to Eastern Europe will be
indicated as such.
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gary, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Bulgaria. 6
A. Diffuse v. Concentrated: The American and European Models
Most of the disparities between the Eastern European constitu-
tional courts and the U.S. Supreme Court grow out of differences in
the fundamental premises underlying the respective institutions. The
U.S. Supreme Court, the highest appellate level of the U.S. federal
judicial system, exercises the federal government's judicial power. It is
not a court for constitutional issues in the strictest sense, but rather a
final appellate tribunal,7 which, in the course of traditional judicial
activity, sometimes issues opinions on basic constitutional questions
that federal and state inferior courts must follow in resolving disputes.
Though the highest court in the system, the Supreme Court is still just
a part of the federal judiciary, adjudicating controversies referred to it
from the lower federal and state courts.
While engaged in the business of resolving these disputes, the U.S.
Supreme Court may interpret federal law, assert the supremacy of fed-
eral law over state law, and resolve jurisdictional conflicts between
state and federal governments, or within the federal government itself.
Like any other federal court, the Supreme Court performs all these
functions only as incident to settling live controversies between con-
tending parties in a suit brought into the system for resolution. The
U.S. Constitution does not explicitly grant the Court power to review
and possibly annul legislative acts, and some judges and scholars still
challenge the exercise of such power, at least in some specific cases. 8
With respect to this dispute-resolving function, the U.S. Supreme
Court resembles the traditional highest courts in conventional Euro-
pean judicial systems, although the latter are not empowered to strike
down legislative enactments in the course of their adjudicatory activi-
ties. If the U.S. Court can resolve the case without deciding any fun-
damental issues, constitutional or otherwise, it is obliged to do so.
6. Because Peter Paczolay, counsel to the Hungarian Constitutional Court president, is writ-
ing an article devoted to that court's role in the area of property rights for this symposium, there
will be virtually no discussion of the decisions of the Hungarian Court in this article. See also
Ethan Klingsberg, Judicial Review and Hungary's Transition from Communism to Democracy,
the Constitutional Court, the Continuity of Law, and the Redefinition of Property Rights, 1992
B.Y.U. L. REV. 41 (1992). As of May 1, 1992, the Romanian Court's judges had not been
appointed.
7. The U.S. Supreme Court also exercises original jurisdiction over a few types of disputes.
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
8. The largely empty debate over judicial restraint versus judicial activism is based on the
disagreement over the extent to which the courts are authorized to review and annul legislative
acts. As demonstrated by the Rehnquist Court, all Supreme Court Justices are judicial activists.
For an elaboration of this contention, see HERMAN SCHWARTZ, PACKING THE COURTS (1988).
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Usually, the narrower the basis for the decision, the better.9
One consequence of the incidental nature of such constitutional
decisionmaking has been that since all courts are supposed to resolve
these cases completely, definitively, and without the need for further
judicial action by a higher court, all U.S. courts can resolve the consti-
tutional issues. Comparativists call this the "diffuse system" of judi-
cial review. '0
The Continental system of constitutional judicial review differs
theoretically. As opposed to the American "diffuse system," Europe-
ans concentrate the power to review the constitutionality of legislation
in one special tribunal which is not a part of the ordinary judiciary and
does not adjudicate conventional litigation,I' a function left for ordi-
nary courts. Thus, the constitutional provisions for the constitutional
courts do not usually appear in the judiciary section of European con-
stitutions but in a separate section, after the articles on the structure of
the national government and sometimes after those on local govern-
ment as well. t2 The provisions for the traditional judiciary, on the
other hand, usually appear after the provisions for the executive
branch.
Unlike its U.S. counterpart, the European constitutional court's
primary function is not to adjudicate controversies between individu-
als or between them and their government, but rather to provide inter-
pretations of that nation's constitution, regardless of how the
interpretational issue arises. As one Italian expert explained:
[The European Constitutional Court] is neither part of the judicial order,
nor part of the judicial organization in its widest sense: ... [T]he Consti-
tutional Court remains outside the traditional categories of state power.
It is an independent power whose function consists in [e]nsuring that the
Constitution is respected in all areas.' 3
9. See, e.g., Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, 331 U.S. 549, 584 (1947).
10. It didn't have to be this way. Because of the importance of constitutional questions,
lower U.S. courts could have been required to refer such issues to a higher court. This practice is
followed in some state court systems; when lower courts consider it inappropriate to strike down
a statute as unconstitutional, they leave the issue for a higher court to decide.
11. These courts also perform certain other functions such as supervising elections and ban-
ning political parties. See infra text accompanying notes 45-48.
12. In the Ukrainian draft constitution, the constitutional court appears in a separate chapter
entitled "Defense of the Constitution" after the local government and before the ratification and
amendment provisions, although it is listed among the other courts in the judiciary article. See
also, e.g., BULG. CONST. ch. 8, arts. 147-51; HUNG. CONST. chs. IV (Constitutional Court), X
(Judiciary); ROM. CONST. tit. V, arts. 140-45; CZECH. CONST. (Constitutional Act No. 143,
1968) ch. 6, arts. 86-101; SPAIN CONST. tits. V (Judiciary), X (Constitutional Court); But see,
F.R.G. CONST. ch. IX, arts. 92-104; RSFSR CONST. (Oct. 1991) ch. XXI.
13. Quoted in Favoreu, Constitutional Review in Europe, supra note 2, at 56; see also Louis
Favoreau, Conseil Constitutionnel: Mythes et Rdalitds, REGARDS SUR L'ACTUALITI, June 1987,
at 12, 13 ("constitutional judges and ordinary judges do not belong to the same family") (au-
thor's translation).
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The constitutional court thus stands apart from the rest of the gov-
ernmental apparatus, including the judiciary, and is responsible only
to the nation's constitution and the values it incorporates. It is not
concerned with resolving concrete, live disputes between people or
with their government, but with "defense of the constitution." As
Judge Valery Zorkin, chairman of the new Russian Constitutional
Court, remarked:
[M]y twelve [ultimately fourteen] colleagues and I are real watchdogs.
The executive and the legislative powers are the bodies the Constitu-
tional court and its chairman must watch. I will never let the President
or the parliament take a wrong step and fall into the abyss. The Court
has all the necessary powers, including impeachment. t4
Although far more openly assertive about the Court's-and his-role
than other European constitutional court judges,' 5 Chairman Zorkin's
attitude is probably not too different from that of his colleagues serv-
ing on the bench of other Continental constitutional courts,16 includ-
ing those in Eastern Europe.
Accordingly, German, French, and other Continental constitu-
tional tribunals have neither hesitated nor apologized when issuing
wide-ranging decisions on basic constitutional issues, often drawing on
unwritten or historical principles and values. 17 A French decision on
freedom of association and an abortion decision in Germany are good
examples: the French Court drew on the Preamble to the Declaration
of 1789 on the Rights of Man for its ruling;' 8 the German court inter-
preted the "right to life" in Article 2(2)1 to limit abortion rights, rely-
ing in part on its notions of "the dignity of man" and sociopolitical
considerations, as well as its reaction to the Nazi policy of destroying
"life unworthy to live."19
The new East European constitutional courts appear willing to
14. Vladimir Orlov, The President Has His Mandate, Not An Indulgence, Moscow NEWS,
Jan. 29, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Currnt file.
15. See infra discussion on the Russian Constitutional Court accompanying notes 99-104,
116-18, 133, 168-71.
16. Chairman Zorkin may be a bit too optimistic about the extent of the Court's power to
implement its decrees. See infra Part II, regarding the Tatar defiance of the Court's finding that
the Tatarstan referendum on sovereignty was unconstitutional. Constitutional Court Decision on
Sovereignty, RoSSIISKAYA GAZETA, Mar. 16, 1992, at 1, 2, translated in FBIS-USR-92-038, Apr.
3, 1992, at 84-90.
17. See CAPPELLETrI, supra note 2, at 53 (the new courts have "frequently ... adopted a
'non-interpretive model' going beyond 'the language of the constitution as illuminated by the
intent of its framers.' ") (footnote omitted).
18. See Beardsley, supra note 4; see also Cynthia Vroom, Constitutional Protection of Individ-
ual Liberties in France: the Conseil Constitutionnel since 1971, 63 TUL. L. REV. 265, 280 (1988).
But see, id. at 303-04 (narrowing the bases for decision).
19. An English translation of the decision is excerpted in DONALD KOMMERS, THE CONSTI-
TUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 349-50, 355 (1989).
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take a similarly broad approach to constitutional analysis. With the
exception of the Russian court, virtually no political question limits
restrain the jurisprudence of many of these courts.20 Indeed, contrary
to U.S. practice, the justiciability provisions in many of these countries
seem designed not to impede but rather to encourage judicial resolu-
tion of volatile political disputes. As experiences in Russia, Hungary,
and Czechoslovakia show, Eastern European political figures have not
hesitated to go to their constitutional courts in highly charged political
situations. 21
The broad decisionmaking powers and authority to resolve polit-
ical issues vested in the constitutional courts are far beyond the range
of the typical civil law judge, whose approach to the judicial function
is usually narrow and mechanical. As Louis Favoreu notes:
Continental European [civil law] judges are "career judges" and in a
sense bureaucrats. Before an all-powerful parliament they do not dare
insist on their conception of the law. This is especially true in view of
the fact that, unlike American judges who mostly pass on the constitu-
tionality of state laws, European judges would have to verify-above all
and even sometimes exclusively-the constitutionality of national laws,
emanating from the representatives of the whole of the nation. That is
why Continental European judges have never dared to start down the
path to judicial review. 22
Indeed, in cases of statutory ambiguity, the French originally in-
sisted that judges refer the matter back to the legislature, to resolve the
ambiguity, though this idea was abandoned quickly. 23 This attitude
was obviously a far cry from how Chairman Zorkin and other Euro-
pean constitutional court judges view themselves today.24 In this re-
spect, judges on the constitutional court in Europe are much closer to
their American counterparts than to their colleagues in the regular
20. See Law of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic "On the RSFSR Constitu-
tional Court," art. 1, § 3 [hereinafter RSFSR Const. Ct. Act] (translation on file with the Michi-
gan Journal of International Law); for a discussion of this issue in Germany, see KOMMERS,
supra note 19, at 163-64.
21. See infra discussion in Part II.
22. Louis Favoreu, American and European Models of Constitutional Justice, in COMPARA-
TIVE AND PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 105, 109 (David S. Clark ed., 1990). For a summary
of the rationale for this kind of civil law judge, see JOHN H. MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW
TRADITION 34-38 (2d ed. 1985); and Mauro Cappelletti, Nicessiti et ldgitimitd de lajustice consti-
tutionnelle, in COURS CONSTITUTIONNELLES EUROPItENNES ET DROITS FONDAMENTAUX 463-
64 (Louis Favoreau ed., 1982), quoted in Vroom, supra note 18, at 271 n.26.
23. Vroom, supra note 18, at 267. See also MERRYMAN, supra note 22, at 36, 39-40 (discuss-
ing the general civil law approach to resolving statutory ambiguity).
24. "Indeed, a few purists within the civil law tradition suggest that it is wrong to call such
constitutional courts 'courts' and their members 'judges.' Because judges cannot make law, the
reasoning goes, and because the power to hold statutes illegal is a form of lawmaking, these
officials obviously cannot be judges and these institutions cannot be courts." MERRYMAN, supra
note 22, at 38.
[Vol. 13:741
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Continental judiciary. 25
Why have all these countries adopted such institutions? After all,
the European tradition involves parliamentary supremacy, for in par-
liament the will of the people is supposed to truly reside. The answer
lies partly in the nations' quest to protect civil and political liberties.
For apart from the East Europeans' desire to follow Western models
in order to be thought fit to join in the Western community of nations,
East Europeans have come to realize what the framers of the U.S.
Constitution discovered 200 years ago: although one must indeed rely
on popular sovereignty if one desires a free democratic society, the
legislature and the executive are also likely to abuse their powers,
26
and an independent judiciary is necessary to guard and promote the
rights of the people against these officials. 27 Judge Learned Hand once
noted that when liberty dies in the hearts of a nation, "no constitution,
no court, no law can save it." '28 This is quite true, but a court can
interpose obstacles to tyranny, and it can embarrass the tyrant. More-
over, as the American founding fathers realized, even a free society is
prone to "ill humors" that can tyrannize its minorities and others.
29
Free and independent courts can provide some protection against
these "ill humors" as well.
B. The New East European Constitutional Courts
What kinds of institutions are these East European constitutional
courts? Perhaps the best way to answer this is to describe what they
25. A good summary of the fundamental characteristics of the European constitutional
courts was made in 1987 by Professor Favoreu in discussing the French Conseil Constitutionnel:
The Conseil Constitutionnel presents the same characteristics as the [European] constitu-
tional courts: [1] "A concentrated control" in the hands of a unique jurisdiction constituted
especially for this purpose and independent of the ordinary jurisdictional structure; [2] re-
cruitment of nonprofessional judges by political authorities chosen for political purposes,
which, far from being a drawback-as one often believes in France-is a necessity because
this assures democratic legitimacy for the constitutional courts when confronting the legisla-
tors; [3] abstract control initiated by political authorities and able to issue a decision voiding
legislation which has the effect of a final judicial judgment; [and 4] a constitutional statute
establishing the court in the constitution itself, its composition and its attributes so that only
a constitutional law ... (which is usually very difficult and often impossible to enact ... ) can
change the constitutional court statute.
Favoreau, Conseil Constiutionnel, supra note 13, at 115-19 (author's translation).
For a discussion of a narrowing of the differences between the American and European judi-
ciaries, see MAURO CAPPELLETTI, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE
(Paul J. Kollmer & Joanne M. Olson eds., 1989), Favoreau, American and European Models of
Constitutional Justice, supra note 22, at 115-19.
26. THE FEDERALIST, Nos. 38, 50 (Alexander Hamilton).
27. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Mar. 15, 1789), in 14 THE PAPERS
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 659 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1958).
28. Learned Hand, address entitled "The Spirit of Liberty" (1944), in THE SPIRIT Of: LIB-
ERTY 144 (Irving Dillard ed., 1959).
29. THE FEDERALIST, No. 78, at 544 (Alexander Hamilton) (Henry B. Dawson ed., 1863).
Summer 1992]
Michigan Journal of International Law
are supposed to do. And since form follows function, the constitu-
tional courts' tasks, including subject matter jurisdiction, determine to
a large extent the procedures by which issues come before them; pro-
cedures that include examination of standing, ripeness, mootness, ab-
stractness, and political questions.
The following section therefore will focus first on the subject mat-
ter jurisdiction of the constitutional courts of Bulgaria, Czechoslova-
kia, Hungary, Russia, Poland, and Romania, their interpretive and
adjudicative roles, as well as the other functions, some of which seem
quite different-though perhaps only superficially-from those re-
quired of the U.S. Supreme Court. Justiciability matters such as
standing and mootness will also be examined. Thereafter, the discus-
sion will turn to individual courts' authority to enforce their decisions
and the selection and tenure of the constitutional court judges.
1. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
The constitutional jurisdiction of the U.S. Supreme Court, as set
out in Article III, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution, does not differ
much from the jurisdiction of an ordinary American court: "all
Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, ... laws...
and Treaties" of the national governmental authority, "admiralty and
maritime" cases, and a variety of other conventional law suits involv-
ing certain classes of parties, including officials, the United States,
states, and citizens of different states.
In practice, the U.S. Supreme Court has come to limit its jurisdic-
tion almost entirely to cases involving important questions of federal
statutory and constitutional law, particularly federal statutory inter-
pretation and review of federal agency action. Indeed, except for state
and federal criminal cases, the bulk of the U.S. Supreme Court's civil
work in recent years has been the interpretation of federal statutes. 30
With rare exceptions, the subject matter jurisdiction of the new
East European constitutional courts differs from that set out in Article
III, even as narrowed by the U.S. Supreme Court. Unlike the U.S.
Supreme Court, the new Eastern European courts concentrate their
judicial activity on constitutional questions. They do not often deal
with such matters as statutory interpretation, which are handled by
the traditional continental court system, except when necessary to re-
30. Of the Court's 120 formal decisions in the 1990-91 term, there were 85 civil cases: 60
were federal statutory cases, 21 were federal constitutional cases, and 4 were state cases not
raising constitutional issues. Of the Court's civil cases, 62 cases involved federal statutory or
other non-constitutional matters; of its purely federal docket, 60 of 76 cases were non-constitu-
tional. See Note, The Supreme Court, 1990 Term, 105 HARV. L. REV. 77, 424-26 (1991).
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solve jurisdictional conflicts and the occasional referral from ordinary
courts. 3'
All six countries under discussion-Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia,
Hungary, Russia, Poland, and Romania-explicitly grant their consti-
tutional courts the authority to determine the constitutionality of fed-
eral32 laws and, in some cases, other legislative acts. Each of the
aforementioned nations, except perhaps Romania, authorizes review
of presidential and ministerial decrees and orders. Only three-
Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Russia-explicitly authorize their
courts to review the constitutionality of state or local law. 33  Poland,
Hungary, and Russia give their courts the authority to review the con-
stitutionality of treaties, either proposed or adopted. Czechoslovakia,
Hungary, and Bulgaria appear to consider treaties superior to domes-
tic law, 34 whereas Romania, Russia, and Poland do not explicitly au-
thorize their courts to compare domestic law with international
treaties or international law.
One rather odd piece of jurisdiction appears in both the Romanian
and Hungarian constitutions: the authority to rule on the constitu-
tionality of parliamentary procedures. 35 The U.S. Constitution, on the
other hand, explicitly gives each legislative chamber the authority to
"determine the Rules of its Proceedings, ' ' 36 which would seem to pre-
clude judicial review of such matters. 37
Jurisdictional disputes also fall within the East European constitu-
tional courts' explicit subject matter jurisdiction. Federal-state dis-
putes are mentioned in the Czechoslovak, Bulgarian, Russian, and
31. See RSFSR CONST. arts. 1, 2, 32, 67, 74 (1991); Polish Constitutional Tribunal Act of
Apr. 29, 1985, art. 20 [hereinafter Pol. Const. Trib. Act] (translation on file with the Michigan
Journal of International Law).
32. For purposes of clarity for American readers, "federal" will be used to describe the coun-
trywide authority, "state" will be used to describe the next level of relatively autonomous govern-
mental authority, and "local" will be used for the regional and municipal government.
33. Neither Poland's constitutional act nor Bulgaria's constitution seems to give their consti-
tutional courts authority to review the constitutionality of state or local law; in Bulgaria, this
may be because the constitutionality of Bulgarian local and regional laws is subject to challenge
in the administrative court because these laws are considered administrative acts. Memorandum
from Judge Metody Tilev to the author (Apr. 1992) (on file with the Michigan Journal of Inter-
national Law).
34. Czechoslovak Federal Republic Charter on Human Rights and Freedoms, § 2 (transla-
tion on file with the author).
35. ROM. CONST. art. 144(b); Act No. XXXII of 1989 on the Constitutional Court § 1(a)
(Hung.) (hereinafter Hung. Const. Ct. Act] (translation on file with the Michigan Journal of
International Law).
36. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 5, cl. 2.
37. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). The first criterion for classifying an issue as a
"political question" is that there is "a textually demonstrable commitment of the issue to a coor-
dinate political department." Id. at 210.
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Hungarian provisions. Intragovernmental disputes between and
among the president, parliament, and cabinet are also included in the
Bulgarian and Russian laws, while Czechoslovakia and Hungary em-
power their courts to resolve interagency disputes. 38
Federal-state disputes raise particularly delicate questions that will
likely test these courts' authority. Such disputes are especially sensi-
tive in ethnically diverse nations like Russia, where Tatarstan's deci-
sion to hold its referendum despite a Russian Constitutional Court
declaration that doing so was unconstitutional raised questions about
the Constitutional Court's ability to enforce its decisions,3 9 and in
Czechoslovakia, where federal-state questions reflect deep divisions in
the country between Czechs and Slovaks.
The Czechoslovak Constitutional Court Act does not contain a
clause making Czech or Slovak law-either constitutional or statu-
tory-subordinate to Czechoslovak federal legislation, but only to the
Czechoslovak federal constitution.40 Even the Czechoslovak Court's
authority to subordinate Czech or Slovak constitutional acts, but not
ordinary legislation, to the Czechoslovak federal constitution will be-
come effective only after a new federal constitution is adopted. 4' This
may not occur for a long time, if ever, given the current impasse be-
tween the Czechs and Slovaks over a new constitution. The impact of
the federal Constitutional Court's ruling that a Czech or Slovak con-
stitutional act violates the federal constitution is also uncertain. When
the Court finds an ordinary law unconstitutional, the appropriate leg-
islature has six months to change it, and if it fails to do so, the law
becomes "null and void." But this does "not apply to Constitutional
Acts" of the republics. 42 What then happens? What is the constitu-
tional status of a constitutional law that the Court has found inconsis-
tent with the federal constitution? The Czechoslovak Constitutional
Court Act is silent.43 Thus, the Czechoslovak Court's jurisdiction
over such disputes may be quite limited, even if its rulings are obeyed
in full, which itself remains to be seen.
38. Deciding intra-agency disputes is one of the few areas where the courts' mandate goes
beyond constitutionality since such issues need not involve any constitutional questions.
39. See infra Part II A. The Russian Constitutional Court was also denied the authority to
settle inter-republic disputes, another indication of the republics' refusal to give a central author-
ity too much power.
40. Constitutional Act of Feb. 27, 1991, concerning the Constitutional Court of the Czech
and Slovak Federal Republic, art. 2(c) [hereinafter Czech Const. Ct. Act] (translation on file
with the Michigan Journal ofInternational Law). Compare with U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2 ("[T]he
Laws of the United States ... shall be the supreme Law of the Land.
41. Czech. Const. Ct. Act, art. 22(2).
42. Id. art. 3(1) (last clause).
43. Id. art. 22(2).
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The constitutions of Czechoslovakia, Russia, and Hungary specifi-
cally grant their courts human rights jurisdiction. Under these provi-
sions, private parties may bring complaints directly to those
constitutional courts, subject to certain procedural requirements. No
such right exists in the other three countries, where it seems that
human rights issues may be raised only in the context of challenges in
the regular court systems. Some of the problems this creates will be
discussed below.44
Romania, Bulgaria, and Czechoslovakia also give their constitu-
tional courts authority beyond the adjudicative function. Constitu-
tional courts in these countries may outlaw political parties and
political associations for "unconstitutionality," as in the case of
Romania and Bulgaria, or unconstitutional or illegal "activities," as in
Czechoslovakia. 45
In several countries, the constitutional courts supervise elections.
Romania, for example, gives its Court the responsibility of "watch-
[ing] over the observance of the procedure for the election of the Presi-
dent of Romania and to confirm the returns thereof; . . . [the]
organization and holding of a referendum and to confirm its returns;
... [and] check[ing] on ...the exercise of legislative initiative by
citizens .... ,,46 The Bulgarian court is required to monitor parlia-
mentary as well as presidential elections.47
These non-judicial supervisory functions over elections are quite
alien to U.S. practice, although the federal courts' role in election
cases, especially reapportionment litigation, may come close in some
respects. 48 The decision in Eastern Europe to turn over the delicate
function of supervising elections to the constitutional courts reflects a
44. See infra notes 81-82, and the accompanying text.
45. ROM. CONST. art. 145(i); BULG. CONST. art. 149.(1) 5; Czech. Const. Ct. Act, art. 7.
These extremely dangerous provisions seem to be patterned on the F.R.G. CONST. arts. 9 (2), 21
(1), under which both a Nazi successor party and the Communist Party were banned in the
1950s, though attitudes since then have changed in Germany. Article 21 (1) provides:
The political parties shall participate in the forming of the political will of the people. They
may be freely established. Their internal organization must conform to democratic princi-
ples. They must publicly account for the sources of their funds.
Article 9 (2) provides:
Associations, the purposes or activities of which conflict with criminal laws or which are
directed against the constitutional order or the concept of international understanding are
prohibited.
The two cases involving the Nazi successor party and the Communist Party are excerpted in
KOMMERS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GER-
MANY, supra note 19, at 222-31.
46. RoM. CONST. art. 144(e), (g), (h).
47. BULG. CONST. art. 149.(1)6,7.
48. The U.S. federal courts' role in naturalization proceedings is another example.
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confidence that these institutions are above the fray and can be en-
trusted with supervising vital political activities.
Finally, since most of the European constitutional courts' work is
original jurisdiction, they take evidence and make factual findings, un-
like the overwhelmingly appellate U.S. Supreme Court.
2. Justiciability
U.S. justiciability requirements enable the federal courts to avoid
deciding many questions of major constitutional significance-a goal
frequently invoked in American constitutional jurisprudence.4 9 The
U.S. Supreme Court has limited its own authority by requiring that
constitutional issues affecting legislation may only be challenged
through adversary proceedings. Issues may not be raised before their
resolution becomes necessary or in broader terms than are required by
the specific facts of the issue before the court. Challengers must
demonstrate that they were injured by the statute's operation or have
availed themselves of its benefits. Furthermore, if the record before
the Court presents some non-constitutional ground upon which the
case may be disposed of, the court must rely on the non-constitutional
rationale.5 0 As Justice Wiley Rutledge wrote in 1947:
The policy's ultimate foundations, some if not all of which also sus-
tain the jurisdictional limitation, . . . are found in the delicacy of that
function, particularly in view of possible consequences for others stem-
ming also from constitutional roots; the comparative finality of those
consequences; the consideration due to the judgment of other reposito-
ries of constitutional power concerning the scope of their authority; the
necessity, if government is to function constitutionally, for each to keep
within its power, including the courts; the inherent limitations of the
judicial process, arising especially from its largely negative character and
limited resources of enforcement; withal in the paramount importance of
constitutional adjudication in our system.51
These notions are alien to the Europeans who have created the
constitutional court for the express purpose of deciding constitutional
issues, not evading them. Unlike the American model, standing is not
based solely on the adversary process; abstract judicial review is wel-
comed, rather than avoided; questions may be considered both before
the question arises as well as after it has been rendered moot; and
49. Only a few, notably Justice William O. Douglas, have challenged it. See, e.g, Warth v.
Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 519 (1975) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
50. Rescue Army v. Municipal Ct., 331 U.S. 549, 568-69 (1947). See also Ashwander v.
TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 346 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring), and LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 67-72 (2d ed. 1988) (overview of justiciability requirements).
51. Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, 331 U.S. at 571 (footnote omitted).
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finally, political questions lie well within the European court's judicial
authority.
a. Who May Sue
The American law of standing, which has gone through several
phases, is premised on the nineteenth century notion of a law suit-
two adversaries, one of whom has allegedly been injured by the other
and is seeking redress through the courts. 52 On top of that, the U.S.
Court has recently overlaid separation of powers considerations 53 and
has injected additional constitutional requirements-injury in fact,
causation, redressability, directness. 4 It has also created requirements
based on "prudential" considerations: The plaintiff's injury must be
specific to him and not generalized,5 5 and the rights he asserts must be
his own and not those of third parties. 56
The East European approach is quite different. Under the East
European model, public officials are a favored class-they are the only
group given standing everywhere and are often the only group at all
with any standing. For most kinds of cases, these constitutions or con-
stitutional acts generally allow one or more categories of public offi-
cial-and only such officials-to bring a given issue to the
constitutional court at a certain time with no additional requirements.
The reason for this lies in the original purpose of these courts: to
ensure compliance with the constitutionally mandated government
structure and to provide legislators with impartial and expert advice
about the constitutionality of proposed or enacted legislation. 7 Pri-
vate persons are thus allowed to sue only occasionally. Human rights
violations are one occasion that has been added, and even there the
specific requirements plaintiffs must meet to achieve standing are
somewhat unclear, possibly for the kinds of considerations the U.S.
Supreme Court has fashioned.58
52. See TRIBE, supra note 50, at 67 ("the business of federal courts [is limited] to questions
presented in an adversary context and in a form historically viewed as capable of resolution
through the judicial process"); Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation,
89 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1285-88 (1976).
53. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984).
54. Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org. (EKWRO), 426 U.S. 26 (1976).
55. Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm., 418.U.S. 208 (1974); U.S. v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166
(1974).
56. Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953).
57. For a general discussion of the origins and rationales for these courts, see BREWER-
CARIAS, supra note 1, at 185-96.
58. See RSFSR Const. Ct. Act, art. 69.1(14) (Court may refuse to hear the case if "inadvisa-
ble."). Favoreu suggests that in few systems do private people have ready access to the constitu-
tional court. Quoted in Vroom, supra note 18, at 272 n.30. But in the United States, there is
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The Bulgarian provisions seem most restrictive: Standing is given
only to the president, a fifth of the national legislature, the govern-
ment, the chief prosecutor, both the Supreme Administrative Court
and the highest regular court, and in some cases, municipal councils;
no direct private access seems available.5 9 Other countries are much
more open. In Czechoslovakia, for example, challenges to laws or de-
crees as violative of federal constitutional, international, or statutory
law may be filed by any of numerous federal, Czech, or Slovak offi-
cials, or one-fifth of the members of the federal or republic legislatures.
Conflicts of jurisdiction may be brought to the Czechoslovak court by
one of the agencies involved. When a political party is banned, the
representative of that party, of course, may bring the action, and
where human rights are concerned, a private complaint is enough
"under conditions set by an Act of the Federal Assembly." Since the
Constitutional Act says nothing more, the federal law-presumably by
an ordinary law and not a constitutional act-will set the require-
ments private persons must meet in order to have their cases heard. 6°
The Hungarian Court's approach is the most generous. In Hun-
gary, anyone can challenge "legal rules and other legal means of state
guidance" as well as human rights violations. There are thus no
standing restrictions for any legal rule that has become effective,
thereby allowing challenges to all existing as well as newly enacted
legislation. 6' But where a preliminary examination of bills, parliamen-
tary acts enacted but not yet implemented, standing orders of parlia-
ment, or international treaties are concerned, standing is given only to
ready access for private persons to some court that has jurisdiction to strike down unconstitu-
tional laws, even if it is not the highest court.
59. BULG. CONST. art. 150.(1).
60. The CSFR law with its broad standing provisions for public officials is probably a reac-
tion to the very narrow standing provisions in the Constitutional Court's interwar predecessor,
under which only a few of the highest federal judicial and legislative officials had standing. The
latter had little incentive to challenge legislation they had usually supported, and the judicial
officials were probably not eager to have another court review their rulings. As a result, in some
twenty years the interwar Court did not handle a single case involving judicial review of legisla-
tion. TABORSKY, supra note I, at 77-78.
61. A human rights organization relied successfully on this provision in challenging the Hun-
garian capital punishment law.
According to Peter Paczolay, both this broad standing requirement and the very broad grant
of subject matter jurisdiction were sought by the democratic opposition to the Communists when
the two sides were arranging what turned out to be a transfer of power from the Communists.
The opposition did not trust any of the established institutions and wanted to give this new
power center, the Constitutional Court, as much authority as possible. The Communists were
apparently unaware of the power they were giving the Court, with which they were unfamiliar,
and did not object. The Court has fully met the opposition's expectations, probably to a greater
degree than some of those who maneuvered its creation now like. Peter Paczolay, counsel to the
Hungarian Constitutional Court president, address at The American University, Washington
College of Law, Apr. 17, 1992.
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the president, parliament,62 a standing parliamentary committee,
groups of deputies greater than fifty, and apparently the collective gov-
ernment, not just a single minister. Conflicts of jurisdiction also can
be raised only by the parties involved. Parliament, however, can ex-
tend standing to those not already included in the various categories.
Like the others, Polish law allows high government officials to ini-
tiate Constitutional Tribunal review, as well as "committees of 50 dep-
uties" and the Ombudsman; the latter is a particularly prolific source
of Constitutional Tribunal cases. 63 In addition, certain private organi-
zations such as trade unions and trade associations are allowed to file
constitutional court actions in matters affecting them. The latter peti-
tioners must go through an initial screening by a single judge, but may
be rejected if their petition "fails to meet the requirements set by pro-
visions of this law or when it is obviously unfounded or misad-
dressed." 64 These objections would seem applicable to all petitions,
however, not just those brought by such groups as unions and trade
associations, and it is difficult to see what additional requirements the
screening process is supposed to impose.
The Romanian constitution sets out few standing rules: Review is
allowed only for initiating rulings on legislation prior to promulgation
or about parliamentary procedure, in which case standing is limited to
high government officials and "at least 50 deputies or 25 Senators. '6
Specific legislation may set out the rules for invoking the court's juris-
diction in other matters.
The Russian Constitutional Act, which includes hundreds of de-
tailed paragraphs and subparagraphs, sets up a very complex system in
which a wide variety of public officials can petition the court to hold
"international treaties or enforceable enactments" unconstitutional, 66
and individual citizens can challenge "law-applying practices" in ac-
cordance with customary law and practice.67 Whereas review is
mandatory in the former case, private complaints can be refused if
"inadvisable. ' 68 This latter provision, of course, allows the Russian
62. It is not clear from the Act what it takes to challenge such a petition. Does it require a
majority vote or just action by the parliamentary leader? See Hung. Const. Ct. Act, ch. III.
63. Ombudsmen are officers of the Polish court system whose duties include the power to
appeal to the constitutional court matters that involve conflicting practices of administrative
bodies. Memorandum to the author from Prof. Leonard Lukaszuk, Constitutional Tribunal vice
chairman (Apr. 25, 1992) (copy on file with the Michigan Journal of International Law).
64. Pol. Const. Trib. Act, art. 20.
65. ROM. CONST. art. 144(a), (b).
66. RSFSR Const. Ct. Act, art. 59.
67. Id. at arts. 66-67.
68. Id. at art. 69.1(14).
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court to develop standing and other justiciability requirements. At the
request of a few high Russian officials, officials of one of the Russian
republics, or on its own initiative, the Russian court may also issue
"findings," which are binding on other courts in their decisionmaking.
In another departure from conventional U.S. practice, several of
these courts-the Russian, Romanian, and Hungarian-can in some
cases initiate actions on their own, without a complaining party. 69 In-
deed, the Russian Court even has the right to initiate legislation, and is
encouraged to do So. 70 Such broad judicial authority seems a serious
encroachment on separation of powers principles. What would hap-
pen, for example, if a law originally proposed by the constitutional
court were challenged as violative of either the constitution or a
treaty? Who would pass upon it?
Finally, unlike the U.S. Supreme Court, these courts may rarely
decline jurisdiction. The Russian provision allowing a refusal to hear
private complaints as "inadvisable" seems to be the exception, rather
than the rule. This has created serious overload difficulties for the
Hungarian Court because of its enormously broad standing
provision.7'
b. Ripeness, Mootness
As noted previously, the U.S. Supreme Court usually will not con-
sider a constitutional attack on legislation unless the challenge is
raised in an ongoing dispute. Unlike U.S. courts, none of the East
European constitutional courts under consideration seem to require a
particular live dispute between adversaries, for all allow the appropri-
ate bodies to challenge and test laws simply by filing the requisite pa-
pers by the appropriate bodies. The Romanian and Hungarian
constitutions allow review even of unimplemented laws. Thus all per-
mit, and indeed provide, that the normal review procedure will be ab-
stract: a legislative act, treaty, or executive decree is to be analyzed on
its face, and not as it applies in a particular disputed instance. Only
69. See id. at art. 55; RoM. CONsT. art. 144(a); Hung. Const. Ct. Act, § 21(7).
70. RSFSR Const. Ct. Act., art. 9.
71. According to a recent newspaper report:
In 1991, the number of cases addressed to the Constitutional Court increased considera-
bly over the previous year's figure: 1,625 cases were filed in 1990, while the number for the
first ten months of 1991 amounted 2,010. Two-thirds of the cases that have reached the
Court so far were found to fall outside its competence. The Court rejected 1,200 appeals,
and a further 100 cases were either transferred to other authorities or returned for lack of
information. The number of cases that were actually deliberated was 698. Most of the cases
(1,620) were brought before the Court by private individuals. Out of the 53 cases in which
the Court declared its verdict this year, 40 were found to have violated the Constitution.
HUNGARIAN OBSERVER, Jan. 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Hunobs File.
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the Russian provisions for complaints by individual citizens about law
application practices seem to contemplate an existing controversy.
Furthermore, there is no indication that mootness will end the
courts' obligation to pass on the challenged legislation or treaty. In-
deed, the Russian Constitutional Court Act requires that court to con-
tinue a proceeding that has begun despite a repeal or expiration of the
act in question.72
This combination of public-official standing and the abstract na-
ture of the review underscores the special nature of the European con-
stitutional courts, another difference from U.S. courts, which avoid
ruling on abstract or moot issues. One of the landmark rulings by the
early U.S. Supreme Court was its refusal to answer questions about a
treaty posed by Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson. In a very brief
response, Chief Justice John Jay and his colleagues wrote Jefferson
that acceding to his demand would be inconsistent with separation of
powers and finality principles.73 This view is obviously 180 degrees
away from the European practice.
Moreover, the European system can continually plunge constitu-
tional courts into political controversies by giving standing to rela-
tively small groups of legislators who have lost a legislative battle.
Thus, the 1974 expansion of standing to sixty deputies of the French
National Assembly 74 transformed the French Conseil Constitutionnel
from a protector of the executive against the legislature to a legislative
weapon against executive action. 75 This is quite common among Eu-
ropean courts.76 Perhaps for this reason very few of these new courts
are precluded from deciding political questions. Only the Russian
court is under such a ban, and the meaning of that phrase in the Rus-
sian Constitutional Court Act is quite uncertain. 77 This sharply con-
trasts with the United States, where congressional standing is
narrowly confined to prevent losing political factions from turning to
the courts to win judicially what they lost legislatively. 78
72. RSFSR Const. Ct. Act, art. 62.3.
73. Correspondence of the Justices (1793), reprinted in PAUL M. BATOR ET AL., HART &
WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 65 (3d ed. 1988).
74. Standing had been limited to the president, prime minister, and presidents of the two
legislative chambers.
75. Private parties in France still have no standing before the Conseil Constitutionnel. See
MAURO CAPPELLETI & WILLIAM COHEN, COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 47-48
(1979); Beardsley, supra note 4; Vroom, supra note 18.
76. BREWER-CARIAS, supra note I, at 199.
77. RSFSR Const. Ct. Act, art. 1.3. For concerns that this may cover a wide range of cases,
see Carla Thorson, RFE/RL REPORT ON THE USSR, RSFSR Forms Constitutional Court, Dec.
20, 1991, at 14, 16. If the American experience is any guide, these fears are groundless.
78. See TRIBE, supra note 50, at 152-53 (especially authorities cited in nn.54-55).
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Cases also get before the constitutional courts through referral
from the regular courts. It is inaccurate to say that the ordinary East
European judges are barred from deciding constitutional questions.
They can, but they are permitted to rule only one way: They may not
ordinarily strike down statutes. If the ordinary courts find a statute is
unconstitutional, they must refer the case to the constitutional court, a
practice similar to that found in German law. Thus, in Bulgaria and
Hungary, the regular courts must refer a case to the constitutional
court if they find a "discrepancy" between a law or a treaty and the
constitution. 79 The ordinary courts80 must suspend proceedings and
await the constitutional court's ruling. This, of course, reflects the
Continental style of "concentrated" judicial review, as opposed to the
diffuse American style where every court is theoretically authorized to
strike down an unconstitutional statute.
Such a referral requirement has several unfortunate aspects. Apart
from the delay involved in the referral, the procedure is one-sided:
Because referral is mandatory only if the regular or administrative
court finds a "discrepancy" or "considers unconstitutional a legal
rule," only a successful challenge to that law is referred to the constitu-
tional court. To put it in a litigation context, only the government-
the usual defender of such a law-has an automatic right of appeal to
the constitutional court. If the regular court does not find a "discrep-
ancy," and the challenger does not have a right to appeal, the matter
will end there.
This is not a great problem in Germany and Hungary, where pri-
vate parties are entitled to go to the constitutional court, but this right
does not exist in Bulgaria, Poland, or Romania, and only in a modified
form in Russia and Czechoslovakia. 8 ' Moreover, given the normal ti-
midity of traditional continental court judges toward striking down
legislation as discussed above,82 few will be inclined to find the "dis-
crepancy" which, in Germany at least, they must justify in writing.
Thus, when a nation creates a special constitutional tribunal be-
cause it either lacks confidence in the capacity of the ordinary court
system to decide constitutional questions or considers it inappropriate
for such courts to review the acts of the legislature-the primary rea-
79. BULG. CONST. art. 150(2); Hung. Const. Ct. Act, § 38(1). In Poland, Czechoslovakia,
Russia, Bulgaria, and Hungary, the highest ordinary and administrative courts can also initiate
proceedings in, or refer a case to, the constitutional court on a voluntary basis.
80. In Bulgaria, the Supreme Administrative Court and Supreme Court of Cassation.
81. In Russia, a private party has only a limited right, subject to the Court's discretion.
RSFSR Const. Ct. Act, art. 36; in Czechoslovakia, a private party may go the Constitutional
Court only for a human rights violation.
82. See supra text accompanying note 22.
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sons for the "concentrated" approach to judicial review-a referral
should be required whenever a regular court considers that a constitu-
tional challenge simply presents a serious question, as the Polish Con-
stitutional Act provides in certain situations.83 Otherwise, judicial
review by constitutional courts of constitutional issues arising out of
ordinary litigation will operate largely to the benefit of the defenders of
the law and not the challengers. The latter will get to the constitu-
tional court only if they have already won, and not if their challenge
failed. Such one-sidedness does not belong in a system of justice.
3. Selection and Tenure
Constitutional court judges are appointed through explicitly polit-
ical methods. In each case, the constitutional court judges are selected
in whole or in part by the parliaments, sometimes by simple majority
rule.8 4 In Czechoslovakia, the president chooses from among lists sub-
mitted by the federal, Czech, and Slovak legislatures. In Romania and
Bulgaria, the nations' respective presidents also select some members,
and in Bulgaria the chief judges of the administrative and ordinary
courts select a third.
Only the Russian court judges have life tenure, though only until
retirement at age sixty-five.8 5 The rest of the countries, possibly con-
cerned about concentrating too much power in such a group, usually
limit their judges to one term of seven to nine years, with the exception
of Hungary, which allows one renewal of a nine-year term, and Czech-
oslovakia, where the Constitutional Court Act 6 is silent as to renew-
ability, thereby implicitly allowing it.
Despite the lack of life tenure and the inevitably political nature of
the selection process-which, incidentally, is equally political for the
courts of several other countries including France, Germany, and the
United States-those East European courts that have decided cases
have shown little deference to the governments and legislatures that
appointed them. The Hungarian and Russian constitutional courts
have shown remarkable independence and courage. 87 In this respect,
these judges are following the pattern laid down by the French and
German constitutional court judges, who have also been quite in-
83. Pol. Const. Trib. Act, art. 10.1.
84. RSFSR Const. Ct. Act, art. 3.1; Pol. Const. Trib. Act, art. 13.2; BULG. CONST. ch. 8, art.
147(1) (one-third of twelve judges); ROM. CONST. tit. V, art. 140(2) (three of nine judges by one
legislative chamber, three by the other); HUNG. CONST. ch. IV, § 32/A(l) (a judge must be
elected by two-thirds majority of the parliament).
85. RSFSR Const. Ct. Act, art. 16.1.
86. HUNG. CONST. ch. II, § 8(3); Czech Const. Ct. Act.
87. See infra Part II.
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dependent, despite the political selection process in those countries.88
In part this may be because the almost universal limitation to one judi-
cial term means there is little to gain from deferring to the politicians;
this may also occur in part because many of the lawyers chosen as
judges have been distinguished lawyers-especially the chief judges,
who may be relatively apolitical-though some have not had good rep-
utations. And finally, it may in part follow because few are profes-
sional politicians with continuing political ambitions.
The uncertain effect of some European constitutional rulings may
also be different from the emphatic finality insisted upon by the U.S.
Supreme Court for its rulings and those of its fellow federal courts,
though that is not certain. In Hayburn's Case8 9 the Supreme Court
refused to accept jurisdiction over pension claims of disabled veterans
because the judicial decisions were not final but could have been at
least suspended "by the Secretary of War ... where he [had] cause to
suspect imposition or mistake .... 90
Although the decisions of most of these Continental constitutional
courts also are said to be final, in Romania pre-promulgation decisions
on the constitutionality of legislative enactments and parliamentary
rules may be overridden by a two-thirds vote of either legislative
chamber. Since a two-thirds vote of both chambers is necessary for a
constitutional change in Romania, the override possibility represents a
true intrusion on the finality of constitutional decisions, except that it
applies only to pre-promulgation enactments and parliamentary proce-
dures, not to enacted laws. In Poland, a Constitutional Tribunal deci-
sion annulling a law may also be overridden by a two-thirds vote of the
Sejm, the primary legislative chamber, in the presence of at least half
the Sejm deputies. 91 But since these are the same requirements as
those for a constitutional amendment, 92 the override is tantamount to
such an amendment, which can always override a constitutional nulli-
fication. So far, only one minor Tribunal decision has been overturned
by the Sejm. 93
88. See CAPPELLETrI, supra note 2; BREWER-CARIAS, supra note 1.
89. 2 U.S. (2 Dal].) 409 (1792).
90. Id. at 410 n.2.
91. Pol. Const. Trib. Act, art. 6.
92. POL. CONST. art. 106.
93. Conversations with Mark Brzezinski and Tribunal Vice President Leonard Lukaszuk in
Warsaw (Apr. 24-25, 1992). Brzezinski, an American Fulbright Scholar, studied the Polish
Court during 1991-92.
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II. THE EAST EUROPEAN CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS IN ACTION
As of this writing, only five of these new constitutional courts have
become operational-those in Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Poland, Hun-
gary, and Russia.94 Of these five, the Hungarian and Russian courts
are perhaps the most powerful. Because Peter Paczolay, counsel to
the Hungarian Constitutional Court president, will discuss that court
elsewhere in this symposium, I will focus my discussion on the Rus-
sian Court and then summarize some recent actions of the Bulgarian,
Polish and Czechoslovak courts.95
A. The Russian Constitutional Court
Established in October 1991, the Russian Court's first few months
in office provide many lessons about the scope and limits of a constitu-
tional court's power.96 In a nation without a history of either judicial
review or even an independent judiciary, the Court first struck down a
decree by a popular president and then a proposed referendum action
by an autonomous republic. Between the two, it responded to private-
citizen complaints on a pension matter and at the end of April decided
another jurisdictional dispute between the president and the parlia-
ment, this time in favor of the president. On its docket are many more
delicate questions, including the legality of President Boris Yeltsin's
ban against the Communist Party.
The first actions of the Russian Constitutional Court, led by out-
spoken judges,97 including Chairman Valery Zorkin,98 are astonishing
when viewed against the backdrop of Russian and Soviet history. As
94. The Czechoslovak Court was just established in March 1992. The Bulgarian Court has
been in operation about a year. The Polish Constitutional Tribunal, the oldest of the constitu-
tional courts under discussion, has operated since 1985, but has only limited jurisdiction.
95. See Peter Paczolay, Judicial Review of the Hungarian Compensation Act, 13 MICH. J.
INT'L L. 806 (1992); see also Jonathan Doyle, A Bitter Inheritance: East German Real Property
and the Supreme Constitutional Court's 'Land Reform' Decision of April 23, 1991, 13 MICH. J.
INT'L L. 832 (1992); Klingsberg, supra note 6.
96. As of this writing the Russian Court had only 13 of its 15-judge complement.
97. Although as of this writing the Constitutional Court had not yet ruled in a child custody
case, Judge Ernest Ametistov recently said in a news broadcast:
Here is another typical example of an unconstitutional practice. In divorce cases the courts
are inclined to give custody of children not to their fathers, but to their mothers, although
no such norm is recorded within the Law or in the Constitution[. T]he fundamental princi-
ple is the equality of rights of both parents. And the citizens must know this.
Supreme Court is Impartial, (Official Kremlin News Broadcast), FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE, Apr.
27, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Fednew File.
98. Before becoming Chairman of the Constitutional Court, Zorkin was the Chairman of the
Constitutional Commission and almost certainly its dominant figure. He was responsible for
tilting the commission's initial recommendations in favor of a strongly presidential government.
The recommendation was changed in favor of a parliamentary system after Zorkin left the Com-
mission for the Court. For how this bears on the Court's decision on the KGB-MVD merger, see
text accompanying notes 126-29.
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is well known, prior to the arrival of Mikhail Gorbachev, Russian
Communist law did not acknowledge the need for an independent ju-
diciary and certainly not for an independent tribunal exercising judi-
cial review over the acts of officialdom. 99 All authority-including
judicial authority-came from and was supervised by the leadership of
the Communist Party.
A tentative move toward judicial review was made in January,
1990 with the creation of the USSR Committee on Constitutional Su-
pervision, a part of Gorbachev's reforms. The Committee exercised
some independent authority, striking down several of Gorbachev's de-
crees, yet some considered it a failure.l°0 With the demise of the So-
viet Union, it disbanded on December 23, 1991.
As part of the constitutional reform for the Russian Soviet Federal
Socialist Republic-not the USSR, which never made it to that
stage-a constitutional court was proposed in the November 1990
draft constitution, with very broad powers of judicial review.101 With-
out waiting for a new constitution, t0 2 on July 12, 1991 the RSFSR10 3
adopted an elaborate 89-article statute containing hundreds of detailed
provisions establishing a fifteen-member constitutional court with au-
tomatic tenure until retirement at age sixty-five, and vast powers only
slightly diminished from those in the November draft constitution. 1' 4
At the end of October, thirteen of the fifteen judges, including Chair-
man Zorkin,t0 5 were appointed from among twenty-three candidates
proposed by President Boris Yeltsin. 106 Many feared that the court
99. For a good survey of Communist law, see MARY ANN GLENDON ET AL., COMPARATIVE
LEGAL TRADITIONS 672-967 (1985).
100. See Russian Parliament Tries to Undo 'Mistakes, IZVESTIA, Dec. 25, 1991, at 6, trans-
lated in CURRENT DIGEST OF THE SOVIET PRESS [hereinafter SOVIET PRESS DIGEST], Jan. 29,
1992, at 4, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, CDSP File.
But see, Carla Thorson, Legacy of the USSR Constitutional Court Supervision Committee,
RFE/RL RESEARCH REPORT, Mar. 27, 1992, at 55:
Although it had limited authority, the committee was increasingly seen as an alternative
source of political power and as a potential guarantor of human and civil rights. The com-
mittee's inadequacy resulted from the illegitimacy of the law it was entrusted to uphold and
from the fact that its rulings were treated as recommendations and as such were not binding
on the government. Nevertheless, the committee succeeded on more than one occasion in
having legislation overturned.
Id.
101. See Draft RSFSR CONST. (Nov. 1990) (on file with the author).
102. As of this writing, May 1992, the Russian Constitution was still far from adoption.
103. Now known as both the "Russian Federation" and "Russia."
104. There seems to be no power to mediate disputes between republics in the Russian Feder-
ation unless a constitutional question is involved.
105. Although Zorkin remains a proponent of strong presidential power, I was told by a
member of the Russian Parliament that Yeltsin had hoped another candidate, one who was not
appointed to the court, would become chairman.
106. Although some of the judges are well thought of, including a distinguished woman re-
searcher, some doubts have been expressed about the competence of other appointees. Carla
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would be as ineffectual as the USSR Committee on Constitutional Su-
pervision was thought to have been.
Within days of the judges' appointment, a group of thirty-six legis-
lators, mostly former Communist Party officials, filed a petition with
the Court presenting it with its first political hot potato: a constitu-
tional challenge to Yeltsin's post-coup decrees outlawing the Commu-
nist Party, confiscating its property, and banning Communist Party
activity. 10 7 Before the Court reached that question, however, another
challenge to Yeltsin's authority was thrust onto the newly-created
Court: a parliamentary challenge to a presidential decree merging
what was left of the Russian KGB, the state security agency, with the
Ministry of Interior (MVD), which controls the police.' 08 This case
became the vehicle for the Court's baptism by fire.
1. The KGB (ISS)-MVD Merger Decree
Shortly after the August 1991 coup attempt, the KGB was par-
tially dismantled, renamed the Interrepublic Security Service (ISS),
and some of its more notorious units were reportedly abolished. The
change left few differences between the remains of the ISS and the
MVD and a good deal of overlap, according to government officials
who supported the merger decree. 09 The merger was allegedly to
save money and increase crimefighting efficiency, a major concern in a
country facing a steep rise in the crime rate."10 Accordingly, exercis-
ing decree powers given him by the Supreme Soviet on November 1,
1991 in connection with economic reform, Yeltsin ordered the merger
on December 19, 1991, effective immediately, and appointed Victor
Barannikov, a friend from his hometown of Sverdlovsk, to run the
consolidated agency." '
The public reacted with shock and fear. The last such merger, in
1936, was immediately followed by Stalin's murderous purges, and the
Yeltsin merger aroused memories and fears of a recurrence.' 12 There
were also signs that the many remaining KGB members were en-
Thorson, RSFSR Forms Constitutional Court, RFE, REPORT ON THE USSR, Dec. 20, 1991, at
13, 15.
107. Ludmila Yermakova, Legality of Ban on Communist Party to be Revisited, TASS, May
7, 1992, available in, LEXIS, Nexis Library, TASS File.
108. FBIS-USR-92-017, Feb. 20, 1992, at 66, 67.
109. Russian Parliament Tries to Undo 'Mistakes,' supra note 100.
110. Id.
111. 1 was later told in private conversations that the idea for the merger was actually
Barannikov's.
112. Guy Chazan, Yelstin Cancels Order Creating Super-Security Agency, UPI, Jan. 17, 1992,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File; Russian Parliament Tries to Undo 'Mistakes, supra
note 100.
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trenching themselves in key positions in both federal and local govern-
ments. President Yeltsin's commitment to constitutional democracy
was also questioned by some human rights activists and former dissi-
dents. 113 These fears were compounded by a simultaneous press law
proposal that would have severely inhibited journalists.t 14 An Izvestia
headline on the merger decree and press proposal read "A Chill Runs
Down One's Spine."' '15
Such concerns 16 prompted a petition by fifty-one deputies to the
Constitutional Court challenging the merger decree, and on December
26, 1991, the Supreme Soviet passed a resolution directing President
Yeltsin to annul the decree. The next day, the Constitutional Court
met quickly and issued an order temporarily suspending the merger
decree until a definitive ruling," 17 with a hearing set for January 14,
1992. At the same time, Chairman Zorkin began to make a series of
public statements on the Court's role and other matters that to an
American observer seemed startlingly outspoken for a judge. For ex-
ample, the day the Court issued its suspension order, Zorkin
expressed his deep concern over instances in which legislative and execu-
tive authorities have clearly ignored constitutional principles and norms.
He said that in its activity the Presidium of the Russian Federation
Supreme Soviet frequently goes beyond its constitutional powers, usurp-
ing the powers of legislative and executive authorities. The Russian
President's decree on organizing a Russian Ministry of Security and In-
ternal Affairs is contrary to the principles of organizing a state based on
the rule of law. 18
Shortly after the suspension order, the press reported that one
judge had received anonymous threats against him and his family, the
wife and daughter of another judge were accosted in the hallway of
their home, and a third judge managed to escape injury after two "ex-
plosive devices" were hurled at him. I am told that since the Court's
ruling, Chairman Zorkin has received two death threats. A confiden-
tial source told a newspaper that this harassment was a reaction to the
113. Guy Chazan, Activists Say Russian Civil Rights Still Need Improvement, UPI, Apr. 23,
1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File.
114. Olga Burkaleva, Parliamentary Vacation: The Deputies Didn't Even Dream of Peace
and Quiet, RossIlSKAYA GAZETA, Dec. 31, 1991, at 2, translated in SOVIET PRESS DIGEST, Jan.
29, 1992, at 15, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, CDSP File.
115. Russian Parliament Tries to Undo 'Mistakes, supra note 100.
116. There also were other more mundane considerations: Many ISS and MVD employees
feared they would lose their jobs in the merger, and the ISS also reportedly feared that some
MVD officials might use their files for blackmail and other corrupt purposes.
117. Barranikov Interview on Composition of New Ministry, IZVESTIA, Dec. 31, 1991, trans-
lated in BBC SUMMARY OF WORLD BROADCASTS AND MONITORING REPORTS, Jan. 1, 1992,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, BBCSWB File.
118. Burkaleva, supra note 114.
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Constitutional Court's suspension order.'1 9 It was also alleged that
some members of the MVD and ISS began to destroy files. 120
In the meantime, the government had accelerated the merger after
the petition was filed and began planning the forcible suppression of
any disruptions that might result from the lifting of price constraints.
These plans were kept secret, which angered the Court; others de-
scribed them as a restoration of "the repressive functions of security
organs inside the country."' 21
In addition, the Court was told that Barannikov, who headed the
merged agency, had said to his staff on December 27, 1991, the day
after the Court's first order:
The people are fed up with perestroika. The President's only support is
the Armed Forces and the security and internal affairs agencies .... I
will investigate the lobby that is opposing the merger and the enforce-
ment of the President's decree.1 22
At first President Yeltsin tried to postpone the hearing indefinitely,
perhaps in order to continue with the merger despite the suspension
order, but his request was brusquely denied.' 23 The challengers ar-
gued the decree was a threat to democracy and to individual rights;
Sergei Shakhrai, state counsellor for legal policy, disputed this and ar-
gued that it was within the Russian president's powers. 24
After eight hours of argument and two hours' deliberation, a unan-
imous Court declared the merger unconstitutional because the decree
violated principles of separation of powers under the 1977 Russian
constitution, which has remained in effect pending the adoption of a
new constitution.1 25 A full opinion was issued approximately two
119. Julia Kozgreva, Don't Pass Judgment Fellas! Judges Are Not Easy to Scare, KOMSOMOL-
SKAYA PRAVDA, translated in SOVIET PRESS DIGEST, Jan. 4, 1992, at 1, available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, CDSP File.
120. See Russian Parliament Tries to Undo 'Mistakes, supra note 100.
121. The Russian Court learned of these plans during the course of the hearing on the decree
Jan. 14, 1992. FBIS-USR-92-007, Jan. 23, 1992, at 87.
122. Valery Rudnev, Constitutional Court Rescinds B. Yeltsin's Decree on the Creation of
Security and Internal Affairs, IZVESTIA, Jan. 15, 1992, at 1, 3, translated in SOVIET PRESS DI-
GEST, Feb. 19, 1992, at 13, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, CDSP File (ellipsis in original).
123. Id.
124. Some witnesses did not appear at the hearing, and the Ministry concealed some docu-
ments from the Court. At the close of the argument, Zorkin stated that these two issues would
be considered at a later date. As of this writing, it was unclear whether the Court had taken any
action on them.
125. The ruling read as follows:
Having heard in open court the case testing the constitutionality of the Russian President's
[merger] decree ... the court has decided to declare this decree to be not in keeping with the
RSFSR Constitution from the standpoint of the separation of legislative, executive and judi-
cial powers established in the republic and ... codified in the Constitution. This decision is
final, cannot be appealed, and enters into force immediately after its proclamation. [T]his
means that the Russian President's Decree on the Formation of the Ministry of Security and
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weeks later, confirming that decision.
Specifically, the Court held that the 1977 constitution granted only
the Supreme Soviet, and not the executive, the power to create minis-
tries, which the Supreme Soviet has exercised through laws and resolu-
tions since 1990. Whatever powers the president was given by the
Supreme Soviet's action of November 1991 remained subject to the
Supreme Soviet's approval, creating "a special mechanism ... for pre-
liminary monitoring" over executive decrees. Such monitoring, the
Court found, "is an element of the system of checks and balances,
inherent in the principle of separation of powers."' 26
The Court also stressed that the Supreme Soviet has the constitu-
tional authority to participate in the development of basic defense and
state security measures, and that other branches of government could
not remove such issues from the Supreme Soviet's authority. Further-
more, the Court noted that a week after Yeltsin announced the
merger, the Supreme Soviet had passed a resolution directing him "to
annul his decree."1 27
Concluding that the decree violated the spirit and letter of numer-
ous other resolutions of the Supreme Soviet, it found that the decree
"in practice deprived the RSFSR Supreme Soviet of the opportunity to
participate in the formation of basic measures in ... defense and...
national security,"' 28 in violation of the constitution. This, the Court
found, affected the most fundamental citizens' rights "such as the
right of inviolability of the person, of privacy, of the home, and of the
secrecy of ... communications."'' 29
The immediate aftermath was confusing. Although Shakhrai was
supposed to have harbored doubts about the merits of his case,' 30 he
deplored the decision as not "juridical" but based on "political and
ideological motives" derived from the ambiguities of the current con-
stitution. ' 3' At first Shakhrai warned, "This does not mean the decree
Internal Affairs and all other ... acts ... based on this decree or reproducing it lose their
legal force and are to be considered invalid[, and) are to revert to the state existing before the
adoption of the unconstitutional decree.
Rudnev, supra note 122.
126. FBIS-USR-92-017, supra note 108, at 67.
127. Id. at 68.
128. Id.
129. The Court subsequently imposed a fine of 500 rubles on a newspaper that had printed
the decree but not the Court's decision.
130. See Sergei Mostovshchikov, Will the Constitutional Court Rescind Yelstin's Decree Cre-
ating the Ministry of Security & Internal Affairs, IZVESTIA, Jan. 9, 1992, at 7, translated in So-
VIET PRESS DIGEST, Feb. 5, 1992, at 31, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, CDSP File.
131. State Counselor Accepts Court Ruling on Decrees, ROSSIISKAYA GAZETA, Jan. 20, 1992,
at 2, translated in FBIS-SOV-92-015, Jan. 23, 1992, at 44-45.
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ceases to be in effect," but then added, "The government should obey
the Constitutional Court."' 132 This raised doubts as to whether the
government would comply with the Court's decision. Zorkin and a
court spokeswoman threatened Shakhrai with impeachment if he re-
peated either his comments about the "political" nature of the ruling
or about the effect of the decree.133
President Yeltsin's first reaction also was ambiguous. Zorkin re-
ported that it took him an hour to persuade Yeltsin that he had to
obey the Court's ruling.134 A few days later Yeltsin issued an order
separating the two agencies. But because he put Barannikov, who had
been head of the MVD, in charge of the security agency and Baran-
nikov's former deputy in charge of the MVD, one newspaper sug-
gested that Yeltsin had "outwitted both the Russian Parliament and
Constitutional Court."' 135
The Court's first foray into judicial review-albeit only of an exec-
utive decree, not legislative action-clearly shows a determination to
insist on the rule of law. This determination is reflected not only in
the decision, but in the series of extrajudicial statements by its chair-
man.1 36 The decision involved a good deal of courage, for it took on a
popular president, although the decree itself was unpopular and was
opposed by a variety of constituencies. 137 And though there was ner-
vousness about whether it would be obeyed-a nervousness that con-
tinues because of the possible de facto union resulting from the fact
that the heads of the now formally separated agencies are Victor
132. Security, Internal Ministry Decree Nullified, TASS INT'L SERV., Jan. 14, 1992, trans-
lated in FBIS-SOV-92-015, Jan. 15, 1992, at 25.
133. Chazan, Yelstin Cancels Order Creating Super-Security Agency, supra note 112. Several
weeks later, I asked Chairman Zorkin whether such a threat did not infringe on Shakhrai's free
speech rights, especially insofar as it was directed at Shakhrai's comment about the decision's
"political and ideological motives." Zorkin replied, "Not where a public servant was concerned.
As a private citizen, he can say what he wants to, but as a public servant he is speaking for the
President and was, in effect, accusing the Court of misconduct." Interview with Valery Zorkin,
Russian Constitutional Court chairman, in Moscow (Jan. 31, 1992).
134. Dmitry Kazutin, Review of the Press Coverage of the Officers' Assembly, Russian Writ-
ers' Protests, and the Constitutional Court Ruling, Moscow NEWS, Jan. 22, 1992, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, Currnt File.
135. By Hook or By Crook, MOSKOVSKY KOMSOLETS, Jan. 17, 1992, at 1, translated in SO-
VIET PRESS DIGEST, Jan. 17, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, CDSP File.
136. The day after the decision, Zorkin told a television interviewer that the decision "has
been aimed not against the president, but for his protection. The main guarantee that this deci-
sion will be observed ... is the mood of society itself. If society rejects this new option, I think
nothing will save either the president, the legislators, or the Constitutional Court." Constitu-
tional Court on Invalidation Decree (Moscow Russian Television broadcast, Jan. 15, 1992), trans-
lated in FBIS-SOV-92-01 1, Jan. 16, 1992, at 38.
137. See supra note 116.
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Barannikov and his former deputy-President Yeltsin's willingness to
accept the decree, at least formally, is a hopeful sign.
As to the merits of the decision, an expert on Soviet law has in-
formed me that it is clearly sound. 138 The opinion is cast in a dry,
technical, almost legalistic style, but that approach may be appropriate
during the Court's early years, particularly because the opinion does
point to the possible harm the decree might inflict on individual rights.
On the other hand, State Counsellor Sergei Shakhrai's lament
about the difficulties of working with an old constitution is well-
founded and echoed in Hungary and elsewhere. The new constitu-
tional courts are trying to apply new laws, concepts, and amended
constitutional provisions to old laws and constitutions based on very
different concepts. The problem is compounded by the fact that since
so few of these countries have adopted wholly new constitutions, but
have simply amended their existing charters, the courts are often try-
ing to reconcile old and new provisions in the same constitution.
Finally, it is fortunate that its most visible judge, Chairman
Zorkin, was known not as an opponent of a strong executive, but as
quite the opposite, as someone whose objectivity was questioned be-
cause of his support for a strong president and his prior government
service. As he said to me with a faint smile, "No one can accuse me of
harboring any hostility to the President."' 139
2. The Tatarstan Referendum
The Court was not so lucky when it was forced-again, unexpect-
edly and by events-to consider the constitutionality of the March
1992 Tatarstan referendum.
It was expected that Russia would face monumental problems af-
ter the breakup of the Soviet Union-creating a market economy that
can provide adequately for its people, building a democracy and estab-
lishing relations with Ukraine and the other members of the former
Soviet Union. What few expected was that Russia itself, a collection
of twenty republics and many different ethnic units and religions,
would face the same centrifugal forces as those that destroyed the So-
viet Union. But it has. The breakup of the Soviet Union unleashed a
wave of ethnic nationalism across the region.1 40 What Boris Yeltsin
138. Conversation with Professor Alexander Blankenagel, professor of law, Wirzburg, Ger-
many, in Berlin (Jan. 27, 1992).
139. Interview with Zorkin, supra note 133.
140. The "nationalities problem"-the task of bringing together scores of very different na-
tional, ethnic, and religious groups-has bedeviled Russia for centuries. It remains, according to
Oleg Rumyantsev, the Russian Constitutional Commission's General Secretary and its de facto
chairman, the major stumbling block to a new constitution. See Federation: May the Voice of the
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did to Mikhail Gorbachev and the Soviet Union is now being done to
Yeltsin by several of the constituent republics of the Russian
Federation. 14
The problems with Tatarstan 142 began to take constitutional form
on August 30, 1990, when its government issued a Declaration of State
Sovereignty just three months after Russia declared its sovereignty.
Tatarstan's Declaration, which was to be the basis for a new Tatarstan
constitution and laws, omitted any reference to Tatarstan remaining
part of Russia. 143
The Russian authorities, preoccupied with their own problems vis-
i-vis the Soviet Union, did nothing. Thereafter, in April 1991, Tatar-
stan revised the preamble to its constitution and the titles of certain
constitutional articles so that they no longer included Tatarstan in the
Russian Federation or accepted the supremacy of Russian law over
the laws of Tatarstan.144 Russian authorities continued to do nothing.
Then, on November 29, 1991 and February 21, 1992, Tatarstan
nationalist pressure produced a series of laws that scheduled a referen-
dum on March 21, 1992, on the following question:
Do you agree that the Tatarstan Republic is a sovereign state and a party
to international law, basing its relations with the Russian Federation and
other republics and state on treaties between equal partners? Yes or
no? 14
5
At the same time, in late January or early February 1992, Tatarstan
stopped transmitting tax collections to Moscow. 146 This time the Rus-
Law Be More Audible than the Voice of the Legislation, RossIsKAYA GAZETA, Mar. 6, 1992, at
1, translated in SOVIET PRESS DIGEST, Mar. 25, 1992, at 18, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
CDSP File. See generally STEPHAN Kux, SOVIET FEDERALISM: A COMPARATIVE PERSPEC-
TIVE (1990).
141. Chechen-Ingushetia, now the self-styled Republic of Chechnya, was one of the first to
try to break away. When Yeltsin responded with force, the Russian Parliament stopped him,
and the matter simmers. Yeltsin has proposed a treaty among the republics which eighteen have
signed; Tatarstan and Chechnya have refused to sign. See Guy Chazan, Russian Official Says
Tatarstan Referendum Catastrophic, UPI, Mar. 18, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
UPI File.
142. Tatarstan, an autonomous republic within the Russian Federation, has been ruled by
Russia since 1552, when it was conquered by Ivan the Terrible. Its people, half ethnic Tatars and
the other half Russians, live together peacefully with a good deal of intermarriage. The region is
a major oil and gas producer and defense industry center and has always considered itself ex-
ploited and dominated by Moscow. Tatarstan tried unsuccessfully for years to become a Union
republic within the USSR, but failed in part because it is completely enclosed by other republics.
Stalin reportedly said that the people of Tatarstan had as much chance of becoming a Union
republic as they had of seeing their own ears. Ann Sheehy, Tatarstan Asserts Its Sovereignty,
RFE/RL DAILY REPORT Apr. 3, 1992, at 1-2.
143. See Ludmila Yermakova, Russian Court Against Referendum in Tatarstan, TASS, Mar.
18, 1992, translated in, LEXIS, Nexis Library, TASS File.
144. FBIS-USR-92-038, supra note 16, at 85.
145. Id. at 87.
146. Inna Muravgoya, Notes to the Point: Test of Responsibility, RossiISKAYA GAZETA, Mar.
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sian authorities reacted, and strongly.
Nobody knew or knows what the question posed in the referendum
really meant. Assertions that it referred to secession were repeatedly
denied by Tatarstan leaders, who declared that all they wanted was to
be treated as a "sovereign state," a "subject of international law" that
would "build relations with Russia on the basis of a treaty.., to be on
an equal footing."147 They did not intend that Tatarstan have either a
separate currency, its own defense forces, or separate embassies
abroad. Instead, the treaty would be a "treaty of alliance."' 148 Tatar-
stan representatives admitted that the question was deliberately am-
biguous so that people would vote "yes" without realizing they were
voting for secession. 149
Opposition party leaders in Tatarstan and others suggested that
the referendum and possible secession was a way of keeping in power
Tatarstan's current rulers who are old-line Communists; Tatarstan
President Mintimer Shaimiyev supported the August coup, and re-
form in Tatarstan has moved very slowly. "Secession here does not
mean democracy," warned one Western diplomat.' 50
Fearing the referendum proposal as both a vehicle of Tatarstan
secession and an example to other restive groups in the Russian Feder-
ation, on March 5, 1992 a group of Russian deputies led by Constitu-
tional Commission Secretary General Rumyantsev petitioned the
Russian Constitutional court to review the constitutionality of the ref-
erendum. ' 5 ' The deputies argued that the referendum might lead to a
change in the Russian Federation's territory, which the constitution
forbids republics to attempt unilaterally.' 52
The Court promptly scheduled a hearing for March 13. Repre-
sentatives of the Tatarstan Republic refused to attend, later claiming
6, 1992, at 1-2, translated in SOVIET PRESS DIGEST, Mar. 25, 1992, at 6, available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, CDSP File.
147. The Russian government also felt that the referendum was simply the first step toward
secession, even though the question did not explicitly call for that. See Official Point of View,
ARGUMENTY I FAKTY, Mar. 11, 1992, at 4, translated as Official Stance Outlined, FBIS-USR-
92-038, Apr. 3, 1992, at 91-92.
148. Interview with Mintimer Shaimiyev, President of the Republic of Tatarstan (Official
Kremlin Int'l News Broadcast, Mar. 13, 1992), translated in FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE, Mar. 13,
1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Fednew File.
149. Muravgoya, supra note 146.
150. Steven Erlanger, Tatar Area in Russia Votes on Sovereignty, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 1992,
at A5.
151. FBIS-USR-92-038, supra note 16, at 84-85.
152. See RSFSR CONST. (May 1991), art. 70 ("The territory of the RSFSR may not be
altered without its consent.").
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they did not have enough time to prepare.1 53 Thus, the only parties in
court were representatives of the Russian Federation deputies and the
Supreme Soviet itself.'1 4 After several hours of argument and testi-
mony, all of it inevitably one-sided, the Court found that both the
1990 Declaration of Sovereignty and the referendum question violated
the Russian Constitution in several respects:
(1) The denial of the supremacy of federal laws over the laws of
members of the federation is contrary to the constitutional status of the
republics in a federated state and precludes the establishment of a law-
governed state.1 55
[(2)] The decree is ... a legislative instrument, predetermining the
direction and content of the legislative process. 156
[(3) W]ithout denying the national group's right to self-determina-
tion exercised by means of a legal expression of the electorate's will, we
must proceed from the fact that international law limits it to the obser-
vance of the requirements of the principle of territorial integrity and the
observance of human rights. 15 7
(4) According to the Constitution of the RSFSR, the Tatarstan Re-
public is part of the RSFSR (Article 71); the territory of the Tatarstan
Republic is part of the territory of the RSFSR and may not be changed
without its consent (Article 70); the Constitution of the Tatarstan Re-
public must correspond to the RSFSR Constitution (Article 78); the
RSFSR Constitution must be observed by state and public organizations
and officials (Article 4); a change in the national-state structure of the
RSFSR requires a constitutional amendment, which is within the exclu-
sive jurisdiction of the RSFSR, represented by its supreme bodies of gov-
ernment (Clause 1 of Article 72, Clause 3 of Article 104, and Clause 12
of Article 109).
The RSFSR Constitution does not specify the right of the republics
making up the RSFSR to withdraw from the federation. This right is
not specified in the Constitution of the Tatarstan Republic. The unilat-
eral declaration of this right by the Tatarstan Republic would be an affir-
mation of the legality of a complete or partial violation of the territorial
unity of the sovereign federated state and the national unity of the na-
tional groups inhabiting it. Any actions intended to violate this unity
will damage the constitutional order of the RSFSR and will be incom-
153. Interview with Mintimer Shaimiyev, supra note 148.
Chairman Zorkin has denied these claims, stating that as early as March 3, 1992, the Chair-
man of Tatarstan's Supreme Soviet had notice of the petition challenging not only the referen-
dum's constitutionality, but also the validity of the sovereignty declarations leading up to the
referendum. Constitutional Court Chairman Presents Ruling on Tatarstan (Channel 1, Moscow
TV broadcast, Mar. 18, 1992), translated in BBC SUMMARY OF WORLD BROADCASTS, Mar. 20,
1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Currnt File.
154. Many other high officials appeared in court, some of whom, including nationalist Vice-
President Alexander Rutskoi, testified.
155. FBIS-USR-92-038, supra note 16, at 85.
156. Id. at 87.
157. Id. at 88.
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patible with international rules on human rights and the rights of na-
tional groups. 58
[(5) The ambiguity of the question deprives citizens of the right "to
express their will freely [and] to participate in the discussion and adop-
tion of laws and decisions of state-wide significance .... ,t59
The Court's reasoning on the Declaration of Sovereignty seems
perfectly sound. A constituent unit of a federation bound to follow
federal law cannot unilaterally reject that law, so long as it remains
within the federation. Article 81 of the Russian Constitution specifi-
cally provides that in conflicts between federal and republic law, "the
law of the RSFSR shall prevail." 16°
The referendum decision seems more problematic. A referendum
of this kind, which simply asks whether the people agree on the status
of the entity, would not usually have any legal significance. It is not
an obvious part of either the constitutional or legislative process. In-
deed, the favorable vote on the referendum appears to have made no
legal or other functional difference. It would thus seem to be only the
equivalent of a public opinion poll on a rather technical question of
constitutional and international law.
Normally, one would think that a governmental unit of any kind,
with the authority to hold a referendum, could ask any question rele-
vant to its functioning. Questions as to what the people of that unit
believe about its constitutional status would seem relevant, though the
answers would clearly not be binding on the government. Such a ref-
erendum would seem to be the business of a constitutional court only
if some legal or constitutional consequences followed.
Chairman Zorkin, in subsequent extrajudicial statements, justified
the Court's involvement on grounds that a positive response to the
referendum would have provided "all legal grounds to secede from the
Russian Federation" should a more nationalist leadership come to
power in Tatarstan.' 61 Perhaps this is true under some unusual provi-
sions in either the Russian or Tatarstan constitution, but this is un-
likely. Neither constitution apparently provides for secession by a
Russian Federation republic. The Russian constitution clearly does
158. Id.
159. Id. The Court also rejected challenges to several of the laws. Later, Chairman Zorkin
commented at a March 19, 1992, press conference that "a positive response to the referendum
question could provoke a surge in nationalistic sentiments and create a threat not only to the
state structure, but also to the observance of human rights." On the Referendum in Tatarstan,
ROSSiSKAYA GAZETA, Mar. 19, 1992, at 1, translated in SOVIET PRESS DIGEST, Apr. 15, 1992,
at 21, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, CSPD File.
160. RSFSR CONST. (May 1991) ch. 8, art. 81.
161. Alexei Tabachnikov, Russian Parliament to Discuss Tatar Referendum Plans, TASS,
Mar. 18, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, TASS File.
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not, 162 and the Constitutional Court did not mention any provisions
for secession in the Tatarstan charter, and certainly none for secession
by referendum.
It is thus hard to see anything more than political significance to
the referendum. Given the ambiguity of the question and the repeated
disclaimers as to an intent to secede by both leaders and voters, 163
there may not even be much political significance, though that is
something that no outsider can evaluate.
The Russian Constitutional Court nevertheless found such legal
significance. In what seems like an implicit response to this doubt, the
Court said:
The decree ... serves as a means of stating important legal premises.
Its wording of the question reflects the new definition of the republic's
state status, based on recent changes in the republic constitution and
recorded in the Declaration of the State Sovereignty of the Tatarstan
Republic. By putting this definition of the republic status to a general
vote, the Tatarstan Republic Supreme Soviet is trying to give it the fea-
tures of a rule of the highest order-a rule established by the people. For
this reason, this decree is not only an instrument of law enforcement, but
also a legislative instrument, predetermining the direction and content of
the legislative process. The legislative nature of the decree also stems
from the consequences of its implementation and the direct effect of any
referendum result on future constitutional development in the republic
and in the RSFSR as a whole. t64
Perhaps the referendum does amount to "a legislative instrument, pre-
determining the direction and content of the legislative process" under
Russian law, but the argument is unpersuasive to an American lawyer.
Tatarstan is no more a "sovereign state" or a proper "party to interna-
tional law" after the referendum than before.
On the other hand, if a positive answer to the referendum question
is indeed of legal significance under Russian or Tatar law and does
constitute a legally significant step toward secession, the decision
seems correct. As noted, the Russian Constitution stipulates that the
territorial integrity of the Russian Federation may not be unilaterally
altered. Moreover, the Constitution does not seem to permit a major
change in the relations between the Federation and its constituent re-
publics by a unilateral means. ' 65 Thus, a unilateral move by a republic
toward either such a change or secession would seem constitutionally
invalid, regardless of whether it is a significant political move.
162. See RSFSR CONST. (1977).
163. Interview with Mintimer Shaimiyev, supra note 148.
164. FBIS-USR-92-038, supra note 16, at 87.
165. Id. at 88.
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The Court went further than nullifying the referendum and decla-
ration of Tatarstan legislative supremacy. Chairman Zorkin also criti-
cized Russian Federation officials for not challenging Tatarstan's
August 1990 Declaration of Sovereignty when it was first promulgated
and asserted that the Tatarstan officials had said they had interpreted
this lack of reaction to the Sovereignty Declaration as "a sign of ap-
proval" and were thereby emboldened to go further. 66 Then, after
chastising Tatarstan officials for not showing up in court, for denying
receipt of the decision, and for calling the decision a "judicial trav-
esty," he made an impassioned plea to the people of Tatarstan to re-
spect the court, because if they did not respect the Constitutional
Court, they could not count on their own court being respected in the
future. 67 Then, mixing the need to obey the Court with the social
dangers of secession, he warned of "a situation [that] could exceed by
a hundred times Yugoslavia and all the other civil war flash points
that we have."168
In the few days between the decision and the referendum, Chair-
man Zorkin continued to call for obedience to the Court's decision,
warning of "a collapse of the constitutional order."' 69 At first it
seemed that Tatarstan might amend the question in a special session
on March 16, 1992, but its Supreme Soviet refused while reaffirming
that the referendum was not about secession. 170 The Chairman of the
Tatarstan Supreme Soviet said he had not even looked at the court's
decision because they had not received an "official document;" Zorkin
also challenged this excuse.' 7'
On March 21, 1992 the referendum was held, and despite a last-
minute plea from President Yeltsin, 61 percent of the 82-percent turn-
out voted "yes." In Kazan, the largely Russian capital, 51 percent,
however, voted "no," and there were apparently similar "no" results
in the other large cities. In the countryside, which is largely Tatar, 75
166. Chazan, Russian Official Says Tatarstan Referendum Catastrophic, supra, note 141.
167. Constitutional Court Chairman Presents Ruling on Tatarstan, supra note 153.
168. Id.
169. Constitutional Court Chairman on Tatarstan (Moscow Russian Television Network
broadcast, Mar. 13, 1992), translated in FBIS-SOV-92-051, Mar. 16, 1992, at 63.
170. Ann Sheehy, Tatarstan Parliament Ignores Russian Constitutional Court, RFE/RL
DAILY REPORT, March 17, 1992, at 2.
171. Constitutional Court Chairman Presents Ruling on Tatarstan, supra note 153; Zorkin
also raised the possibility that the Court might impeach Tatarstan officials who disobeyed the
order. Head of Constitutional Court on Tatar Referendum (Mayak Radio Moscow broadcast
Mar. 18, 1992), translated in BBC SUMMARY OF WORLD BROADCASTS, Mar. 20, 1992, available
in LEXIS, Nexis Library, BBCSWB File.
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percent voted "yes."' 172 After the referendum, Bakturoshtan, another
Russian republic, suspended the operation of the Russian Constitu-
tional Court Act on its territory.'
73
In retrospect, Tatarstan's defiance is not altogether surprising.
The issues of judicial supremacy and respect became intertwined with
and subordinate to the overriding issue of Tatarstan's adherence to the
Russian Federation and its institutions in general. It is now easy to
see that once the forces of nationalism, resentment, and separatism
took command in Tatarstan, they would produce defiance of a Court
decision opposing them. The central authority that the Court was try-
ing to assert was the very thing being challenged by Tatarstan in the
referendum.
The Tatarstan situation obviously represents a serious challenge to
the Constitutional Court. It is difficult to predict both how the Court
will counteract this defiance, if at all, and how this still-unfolding epi-
sode will affect the Russian Court's overall influence and impact.
Although the Court has many difficult issues on its docket, including
the aforementioned actions by Yeltsin against the Communist Party,
few of these cases raise the danger of defiance inherent in a conflict
with a national or ethnic group that is already trying to escape from
federal authority.
3. Other Decisions
As of this writing, few details were available about the Russian
Court's two other decisions. In one case, the Court found that age
discrimination had prompted the firing of two workers; in the other
the Court affirmed President Yeltsin's right to reorganize executive
agencies. As official translations are unavailable at this time, discus-
sion will be limited to the following brief summaries.
In February 1992, the Court responded to an individual complaint
by two pensioners. Judge Ernest Ametistov described the case as
involving
two pensioners who were dismissed from their jobs because they had
reached a pensionable age and [they claimed] were entitled to a pension.
Dismissals on such grounds have lately become commonplace. We ruled
this practice unconstitutional, because in this case we have age discrimi-
nation. And therefore we reinstated the pensioners' rights.
1 74
172. Steven Erlanger, Tatar Area Vote Backs Autonomy Push, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 1992, at
A6.
173. In the Unity of Law and Force, (Official Kremlin Int'l News Broadcast, Apr. 20, 1992),
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Fednew File.
174. Supreme Court is Impartial, supra note 97.
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This decision apparently came down in February 1992.
The other case dealt with a former Soviet copyright agency known
as "VAAP." VAAP had a monopoly on all Soviet publications abroad
and was known for political censorship and KGB connections. In
February 1992, President Yeltsin created "the Russian Agency for In-
tellectual Property" to take over VAAP's functions and property and
appointed a liberal lawyer as its director. At about the same time,
Supreme Soviet Chairman Ruslan Khasbulatov, a long-time Yeltsin
critic, created in the name of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet an
agency called "All Russian Copyright Agency." This was to be the
sole heir to VAAP, and Khasbulatov placed a former KGB general in
charge. 7 .5
On April 28, 1992 the Constitutional Court ruled that the resolu-
tion of the Supreme Soviet Presidium reviving the VAAP was uncon-
stitutional because only the president may reorganize executive
agencies, and he had done so by setting up the Russian Agency for
Intellectual Property.1 76 Khasbulatov had apparently urged the Rus-
sian Minister of Justice, Nikolai Fedorov, to be guided "not just by the
laws but by the ideas of reform." Apparently irritated by such state-
ments, Fedorov commented after the Russian Court's decision, "I am
pleased that there is such a forum as the Russian Constitutional Court
which can put in their place-in the good sense of the word-all offi-
cials and all state bodies."' 177
Not surprisingly, resort to the Constitutional Court has become a
common option for unhappy Russians. Not only are the Communists
appealing to the Court, but the St. Petersburg City Council wants the
Court to remove Mayor Sobchak, t78 the Moscow City Councilors
want it to annul some of Mayor Popov's decrees and its method of
electing mayors, 179 and former USSR Prime Minister Valentin Pavlov,
175. Julia Wishnevsky, Constitutional Court Sides with Yeltsin Against Khasbulatov, RFE/
RL DAILY REPORT, Apr. 29, 1992, at 3.
176. Cf. the KGB-MVB merger decision, supra notes 125-29, and the accompanying text. In
the merger case, the Court held the Supreme Soviet had constitutional authority to create minis-
tries and jurisdiction over actions involving national security and defense. Wishnevsky, supra
note 175.
177. Wishnevsky, supra note 175. After this article was completed, the Court came down
with another victory for President Yeltsin against the Russian Parliament. On the first appeal by
the President to the Court against a parliamentary act, Yeltsin successfully challenged a law
giving Parliament control over an anti-monopoly committee that had previously been a part of
the Government. TASS, May 20, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, TASS File.
178. Yuri Kukanov, Sobchak is Pressured to Resign as Mayor for his 'Opposition to Reforms,'
ROSSIISKAYA GAZETA, translated in SOVIET PRESS DIGEST, Apr. 4, 1992, available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, CDSP File.
179. Yelena Tarasova, District Council Chairman Leads Campaign for Resignation of Mos-
cow Government, KURANTY, translated in SOVIET PRESS DIGEST, Feb. 26, 1992, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, CDSP File.
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one of the coup participants, wants to be reinstated as Russian Prime
Minister. ' 80 Many more such controversies have been noted as possi-
ble Court cases.
4. Summary
In the few months of its existence, the Russian Constitutional
Court has established itself as an aggressive tribunal determined to
safeguard the emerging Russian democracy. As it proclaimed shortly
after its inception:
the Constitutional Court does not intend to get in [the way of reform]
... but any changes in the life of the state, even the most beneficial ones,
should occur within the framework of the law .... [As] the supreme
body of the legal authority it intends to take a series of steps to defend
the constitutional system in the country and prevent dictatorship and
tyranny from setting in, no matter from where they may emanate.'
81
As noted earlier, other European constitutional courts have been
equally independent and forceful, such as the Hungarian and German
Courts. What makes the Russian Court unusual, however, is the ex-
plicit assertiveness of some of the judges, especially Chairman Zorkin.
He has given numerous interviews and made many speeches in the
Supreme Soviet and on television and other media. 182 He has com-
mented on the implications of the decisions and on the official reac-
tions to them,' 83 and has threatened some officials with sanctions for
their hostile reactions. Zorkin and others8 4 have also commented on
public issues other than those directly involved in the cases before
them and have criticized government officials for what they considered
policy mistakes. 85 In short, Zorkin and his colleagues are serious
about the Court's "plan to actively participate in developing a rule of
180. Valentin Pavlov Still Considers Himself Prime Minister, NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, trans-
lated in SOVIET PRESS DIGEST, Mar. 26, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, CDSP File.
181. Constitutional Court Pledges to Thwart Dictatorship, SOVETSKAYA ROSsI1YA, Dec. 27,
1991, translated in BBC SUMMARY OF WORLD BROADCASTS, Jan. 8, 1992, available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, BBCSWB File. The statement first appeared in a Constitutional Court press
release issued at the December 27, 1992 session at which the Court suspended the ISS-MVD
merger decree.
182. See, e.g, Orlov, supra note 14; as noted previously, Judge Ametistov has done the same.
I am told that the Hungarian judges have tried to avoid public attention.
183. See, e.g, D. Muratov, Life Sentence in Court, KOMSOMLSKAYA PRAVDA, Feb. 8, 1992,
at 1, translated in, Constitutional Court, Chairman Zorkin Cited, FBIS-SOV-92-033, Feb. 19,
1992, at 44-45 (need for a conservative party). By comparison, when Chief Justice Marshall
wanted to defend McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819), extrajudicially, he did
it under a pseudonym. See, e.g., JOHN MARSHALL'S DEFENSE OF McCulloch v. Maryland (Ger-
ald Gunther ed., 1969).
184. See supra note 97, and the accompanying text.
185. See, e.g., Chazan, supra note 141.
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law strategy."' 8 6
In the United States and elsewhere, judges have tried to withdraw
from public controversy outside the courtroom to maintain an aura of
impartiality and objectivity. These considerations do not seem to af-
fect Chairman Zorkin, and this observer, at least, has no idea whether
they apply at all in so different and chaotic a society as today's Russia.
What is clear is that in Chairman Zorkin they have not only a skillful
jurist but a powerful personality who, despite differences in style,
might well be Russia's John Marshall.
B. The Bulgarian, Polish, and Czechoslovak Constitutional Courts
It is too soon to predict whether the Russian Court's experience
will have any impact on the developing courts in other East European
nations. Most of the new constitutional courts will probably face is-
sues of ethnic rivalry, human rights, separation of powers, and atone-
ment for the sins of past Communist regimes. This final section will
summarize some of the early actions of three other constitutional
courts.
1. The Bulgarian Court
Although the Bulgarian Constitutional Court has existed for about
a year and comprises a group of distinguished judges, until April 1992
it dealt only with relatively minor matters: the status of parliamentary
representatives, an effort to dismiss a broadcast executive, and whether
a president running for reelection may stay in office during the election
campaign. 87 Until then, no human rights issues had come before the
Court.
In April, however, the Court was forced to rule on one of the most
heated issues in Bulgarian life: relations between the Bulgarian major-
ity and the large Turkish Muslim minority, which comprises about 11
percent of the population. 88 The Turkish minority dominates the
Movement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF), the political party that
came in third in the recent parliamentary elections. While agreeing
not to participate in government in order to avoid exacerbating the
situation by giving the now-nationalistic Communists and their allies
186. Dmitry Kazutin, Review of the Press Coverage of the Officers' Assembly, Russian Writ-
ers' Protests, and the Constitutional Court Ruling, Moscow NEWS, Jan. 22, 1992, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, Currnt File.
187. Memorandum on the Constitutional Court of Bulgaria prepared by Bulgarian Judge
Metody Tilev, who at this writing was studying in the United States at The American University
(Apr. 1992) (on file with the Michigan Journal ofInternational Law).
188. For a discussion of these issues, see Kjell Engelbrekt, RFE/RL REPORT ON EASTERN
EUROPE, Nov. 29, 1991, at 1.
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political ammunition, the MRF is a necessary supporter of the Union
of Democratic Forces' government.
Bulgaria bans parties based on ethnic ties,'8 9 but the MRF claims
that it is not ethnically based, as it includes non-Turks. Still, some
fifty-three members of the current parliament, joined by ninety-three
deputies in the preceding parliament, petitioned the Constitutional
Court to declare the MRF an "anti-constitutional" party and to bar its
twenty-three members from the current parliament, ostensibly because
of the party's ethnic ties. Such a ruling would probably have caused
the government to fall. In a decision on April 21, 1992, the Court, by
a 6-5 split vote, rejected the claim and implicitly affirmed the MRF's
legal status.190 As of this writing, details of the Bulgarian Court's de-
cision were unavailable.
2. The Polish Tribunal
Although one of the oldest East European constitutional courts,
the Polish court's limited subject matter jurisdiction has prevented it
from exercising some of the broad authority enjoyed by the Russian
constitutional court. 19 1
Access to the Polish court is quite limited, as are its powers. It
may not, for example, review local regulations. 192 As a Polish consti-
tutional expert puts it, the Tribunal is designed not to supervise parlia-
ment, but to help parliament maintain its position as the country's
supreme legislator. 193 A bill to expand its powers is currently pending
in the Sejm and will probably be adopted.
Despite its limitations, the Tribunal decided 155 cases from 1986
through 1991.194 Most of these were brought to the court by Poland's
very energetic first Ombudswoman, Professor Ewa Letowska, who re-
cently completed a four-year term in that position to widespread ap-
proval. In fifty-two of these cases, the governmental authorities
altered their behavior in response to the filing of the suit. Very few
cases have been referred to the Tribunal by other courts because, ac-
cording to Vice President Lukaszuk, "They do not have such a tradi-
189. BULG. CONST. art. 11(4).
190. Rada Nicolaev, RFE/RL DAILY REPORT, Apr. 22, 1992, at 4-5.
191. In 1982, a constitutional tribunal was authorized with the very limited subject matter
jurisdiction and standing provisions described earlier, and in 1985 a constitutional act was passed
actually establishing the tribunal.
192. Conversation with Brzezinski, supra note 93.
193. Quoted in Mark F. Brzezinski, Constitutional Tribunal Guardian of the Legal System,
THE WARSAW VOICE, Jan. 19, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Currnt File.
194. Memorandum from Polish Constitutional Court Vice President Leonard Lukaszuk to
the author (Apr. 25, 1992) (on file with the Michigan Journal of International Law).
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tion," and are very averse to "risk-taking."'1 95
During this period, the Polish Tribunal has issued some very con-
troversial rulings, such as affirming a doctor's right to refuse to per-
form abortions, allowing religious instruction in schools, permitting
border guards to appeal their transfers or dismissals to the Adminis-
trative Court, and approving the nationalization of Communist Party
property. Most of some fifty-six cases referred by the Ombudsman
during 1988-91 were resolved in favor of the complainant, although
there are sharp differences of opinion on many matters between the
former Ombudsman and the Tribunal. 196
As of this writing, the most recent important Tribunal decision
struck down two laws passed in September 1991 to reduce pensions
and freeze salaries for state employees. The decision could add $2.2
billion to the current $4.7 billion deficit, according to the Prime Minis-
ter. 197 Nevertheless, the Sejm has refused to overturn the decision,
leading the Finance Minister to resign, and jeopardizing a $2.5 billion
loan from the International Monetary Fund.1 98
The Tribunal has come under criticism from all sides. Composed
half of Communist-era judges and half from the post-Communist era,
it is considered by some to be too sympathetic to the Sejm and not
sufficiently independent. According to one observer,199 it allowed reli-
gious instruction in the public schools even though the Tribunal knew
the law was otherwise, prompting accusations that the Tribunal wrote
the Sejm to that effect after the decision suggesting they change the
law!
Constitutional Tribunal Vice President Lukaszuk has complained
that the Tribunal lacks jurisdiction to apply the international law of
human rights to Polish domestic legislation,2°° though in the border
guard case international law principles were mentioned. The Tribunal
has pointed out this weakness to the Sejm, and it may soon be
changed.
The Polish Tribunal will soon confront one of Poland's most
wrenching social issues-abortion. There is overwhelming public sup-
port for abortion rights, and abortion opponents have failed in their
efforts to narrow Poland's very liberal abortion laws. In December
1991, however, the medical association adopted new rules effective
195. Id.
196. Interview with Lukaszuk, supra note 93.
197. Linnet Myers, Polish Wage Hike Sparks Resignation, CHI. TRIB., May 7, 1992, at C12.
198. Christopher Bobinski, Polish IMF Deal in Jeopardy, FIN. TIMES, May 7, 1992, at 24.
199. Conversation with Brzezinski, supra note 93.
200. Interview with Lukaszuk, supra note 93.
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May 3, 1992 whereby doctors are allowed to perform abortions only in
cases of rape or if the pregnancy threatens the woman's life; it also
leaves the decision to conduct prenatal tests for birth defects to the
doctor alone. 20 1 This is much narrower than current Polish law al-
lows, and the former Ombudswoman, Ewa Letowska, has asked the
constitutional court to strike down the new rules.
3. The Czechoslovak Court
The key challenges facing the Czechoslovak Court include balanc-
ing the nationalistic rivalry between Czechs and Slovaks, and dealing
with the abuses of the former Communist government. Both issues
have already been brought to the Court.
The Czechoslovak Constitutional Court was established in March
1992, over a year after the constitutional act creating the Court was
passed. The delay resulted from the cumbersome selection process
which, in turn, reflected the major problem with which the Court will
probably have to deal-the contentious relationships between the
Slovaks and the Czechs. The Constitutional Court Act provides that
the twelve members of the Court are to be divided equally between the
Czechs and the Slovaks. In an effort to promote impartiality, the
Court was placed in the city of Brno in Moravia, 20 2 rather than either
Prague or Bratislava. The judges are selected by the President from
three eight-nominee lists prepared by each of the Czech, Slovak, and
federal parliaments. 203 The Slovaks delayed preparing their list, and
this slowed the process. The even number of judges, a not-uncommon
feature among these new courts,2°4 and the equal division of judges
between the two nationalities raises a very real danger of deadlocks on
issues affecting relations between and among the two republics and the
federation. 20 5 Because of the absence of a clause establishing the
supremacy of federal law over republic law, only the federal constitu-
tion and human rights treaties prevail against republic law. 20 6
201. Stephen Engelberg, Poland Faces New Battle on Abortion, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21, 1992,
at A3.
202. Moravia, which is part of the Czech Lands, is considered to be a more neutral territory
than either the cities of Prague, the Bohemian capital, or Bratislava, which is the capital city of
Slovakia.
203. Czech Const. Ct. Act, art. 10.
204. The Hungarian Court currently has 10 judges, although it is ultimately supposed to
have 15. Bulgaria has 12, and Poland has 10. Russia and Romania each have an odd number of
judges.
205. The Hungarians have avoided this by accident. In cases where the full court sits, illness
and other absences have resulted in odd-numbered panels. Conversation with Peter Paczolay,
counsellor to the Hungarian Constitutional Court president.
206. Czech Const. Ct. Act, art. 2.
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Without federal law supremacy over republic law, there will be no
ready means of resolving the inevitable clashes of authority between
federal and republic officials, especially since the Czechoslovak gov-
ernmental structure provides for republic administration under federal
legislative guidance. Given the intense Slovak hostility to Prague cen-
tralism, this could derail the economic and environmental reforms
that are within the jurisdiction of both federal and republic govern-
ments. As Justice Holmes said of the United States:
I do not think the United States would come to an end if we [the federal
courts] lost our power to declare an Act of congress void. I do think the
Union would be imperiled if we could not make that declaration as to
the laws of the Several States. 20 7
Although the final comprehensive federal constitution may resolve
these problems, many seem rooted in the Slovak insistence on substan-
tial independence and may be intractable. 208
The first federalism issue came to the Court within its first few
weeks, and though the result has been reported, a translation of the
opinion was not available at the time of writing. The result creates a
rather odd amalgam, but may be constitutionally sound.
On December 12, 1990 the Czechoslovak legislature adopted a
constitutional act dividing jurisdiction over the economy and other
matters between the federal government and the republics. 20 9 For
telecommunications, article 20 gave the federal government jurisdic-
tion over "the organization and control of a uniform system of tele-
communications," the "organization of uniform system of posts" and
"the issue of postage stamps," jurisdiction to set "uniform rules for
postal, telecommunications and radio-communication traffic and tar-
iffs," and the authority to "codify matters of posts and telecommuni-
cations. '210  On a petition from the Federal Telecommunications
Ministry, the Court ruled on April 15, 1992 that the federation can
operate only the telecommunications system; radio and postal systems
are to be operated by the republics. 211 The result seems consistent
207. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 295-96 (Peter Smith ed.,
1952).
208. On these and related problems, see Lloyd Cutler and Herman Schwartz, "Constitutional
Reform in Czechoslovakia: EDuobus Unum?," 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 51, 542-43 (1991). There is
also a possibility that Czechs and Slovaks will be unable to agree on a new constitution and will
try to get by with amendments to the current constitution.
209. Czechoslovak Constitutional Act of Dec. 12, 1990 [hereinafter Division of Powers Act]
(amending the Constitutional Act No. 143/1968 on Czechslovak Federation) (translation on file
with the Michigan Journal ofInternational Law). For the history of this amendment, see Cutler
& Schwartz, supra note 208, at 524-25.
210. Division of Powers Act, supra note 209, art. 20 (emphasis added).
211. FBIS-EEU-92-077, Apr. 21, 1992, at 5-6.
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with the Act's giving the federal government "control" only over tele-
communications. 212 Professor Eric Stein will discuss the decision
more fully elsewhere in this symposium.
213
Where human rights are concerned, the Czechoslovak Charter
mandates that everybody in Czechoslovakia has the same basic
rights.214 This could enable the Court to create some uniformity at
least in human rights. The Court's first opportunity to do this has
already been thrust upon it and in an exceedingly delicate context-
the debate over how Czechoslovakia will deal with the misdeeds of its
former Communist government.
This problem is not unique to Czechoslovakia. One of the most
bitter and tragic of the internal struggles erupting throughout the for-
merly Communist nations has grown out of their efforts to come to
terms with the past. Communist abuses, ranging from murder and
blackmail to repression and ostracism, have left a desire for exposure
and revenge that has begun to tear these societies apart. 21 5
At the same time, Communists and others who held positions of
power in the Communist era are still a potent force in the society,
either individually or as members of organized groups-the Commu-
nists received a substantial number of votes in the June 1990 and 1992
Czechoslovak elections, to take but one example. Many are hostile to
the new democratic regimes and are trying to undermine them. 216
For all these reasons, many of these countries, including Czecho-
slovakia, have adopted or are considering laws to bar those who held
key positions in the prior regimes from holding important positions
today, either for a period of years or indefinitely. Czechoslovakia's
statute, called a "lustration law,"' 217 bars a wide range of former public
officials from a correspondingly wide range of state, state-owned, or
state-controlled institutions until 1995.218 The law, promoted primar-
212. Division of Powers Act, supra note 209, art. 20(e).
213. Eric Stein, Devolution or Deconstruction Czecho-Slovak Style, 13 MICH. J. INT'L L. 786
(1992).
214. Czechslovak Federal Republic Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms, art. 3(1)
(translation on file with the author).
215. Alexander Tolz, Access to KGB and CPSU Archives in Russia, RFE/RL RESEARCH
REPORT, Apr. 17, 1992. Opening the secret police files in Germany has revealed husbands in-
forming on wives, doctors poisoning patients, and betrayals of close friends and family. Kinzer,
East Germans Face Their Accusers, N.Y.TIMES MAG., Apr. 12, 1992, at 24.
216. One method is to abandon the traditional Communist disdain for nationalism-only the
class struggle counts-and suddenly become intensely nationalistic. This is the case in Slovakia,
Bulgaria, Tatarstan, and elsewhere.
217. "Lustration" means purification.
218. Act 451/91 (Oct. 4, 1991), reprinted in NEWS FROM HELSINKI WATCH: CZECHOSLO-
VAKIA, Apr. 1992, app. at 9-17 (copy is on file with the Michigan Journal of International Law).
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ily by right-wing members of the Federal Assembly, has come under
severe criticism both in Czechoslovakia and outside, 219 and formed the
basis for a constitutional court petition filed by ninety-nine members
of the Federal Assembly. 220 It will probably be the second major case
the Court handles. 221
III. CONCLUSION
The outcome of the democratic experiment in these newly liber-
ated countries is far from certain. Economic, ethnic, nationalist, envi-
ronmental, and religious controversies will trouble these nations for
years to come, threatening democracy and the commitment to a rule
of law. Few of these countries save Czechoslovakia has a strong dem-
ocratic tradition to draw upon, indeed, the pre-World War II years
before first Nazi and then Communist dictatorships, saw numerous
failures of democracy and a turn to authoritarianism of one kind or
another.
Under such unfavorable circumstances, the constitutional courts
these countries have created may be too frail to block a really deter-
mined drive to abandon democracy, freedom, and the rule of law.
Nevertheless, whatever chance these countries have to keep develop-
ing into constitutional democracies depends on strong independent
courts that can say no to legislative and executive encroachments on
the constitution.
The performance of some of these courts so far shows that despite
the lack of a constitutional court tradition, men and women who don
the robe of constitutional court judges can become courageous and
vigorous defenders of constitutional principles and human rights, con-
219. The International Labor Office has ruled that the law discriminates on the basis of polit-
ical belief. REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE SET UP TO EXAMINE THE REPRESENTATIONS MADE BY
THE TRADE UNION ASSOCIATION OF BOHEMIA, MORAVIA AND SLOVAKIA, AND BY THE
CZECH AND SLOVAK CONFEDERATION OF TRADE UNIONS UNDER ARTICLE 24 OF THE ILO
CONSTITUTION ALLEGING NON-OBSERVANCE BY THE CZECH AND SLOVAK FEDERAL REPUB-
LIC OF THE DISCRIMINATION (EMPLOYMENT AND OCCUPATION) CONVENTION 1958 (No. 111),
March 5, 1992; Remarks of Catherine Lalumiere, Secretary General of the Council of Europe,
Barbara Kroulik, Lalumiere Criticizes Czechoslovak Screening Law, RFE/RL DAILY REPORT,
Apr. 8, 1992, at 5-6 (violates European Convention of Human Rights); see generally, Jeri Laber,
Witch Hunt in Prague, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, Apr. 23, 1992 (views of Executive Director of
Helsinki Watch). Many of these criticisms were aired at a conference on "Justice in Times of
Transition" convened by the Charter 77 Foundation (New York) in Salzburg, Austria, on Mar.
7-10, 1992, which the author co-chaired.
220. In an obvious effort to avoid entanglement in upcoming parliamentary elections sched-
uled for June 6, 1992, the Court will not deal with the case until afterward.
221. There will be a special impartiality problem in the lustration case, for at least two mem-
bers of the Court-including the President, a distinguished and respected lawyer from
Slovakia-were members of the Federal Assembly and voted for the law. They should recuse
themselves, but need not.
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tinuing the pattern shown elsewhere. Whether they will be able to
continue to do so, and whether the courts in the other former Commu-
nist countries will do equally well, will likely depend on forces beyond
their control. The record so far-and it is still very early-indicates
these courts will do whatever they can to maintain a free constitu-
tional democracy and the rule of law. And this could be a very great
contribution indeed.
